Old Dominion University

ODU Digital Commons
Theses and Dissertations in Business
Administration

College of Business (Strome)

Fall 1998

The Effects of Corporate Diversification and
Control on Division Risk-Taking Strategy and
Performance
Hae Ryong Kim
Old Dominion University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/businessadministration_etds
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Performance
Management Commons, and the Strategic Management Policy Commons
Recommended Citation
Kim, Hae R.. "The Effects of Corporate Diversification and Control on Division Risk-Taking Strategy and Performance" (1998).
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), dissertation, , Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/gnfm-5r35
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/businessadministration_etds/34

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Business (Strome) at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations in Business Administration by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.

THE EFFECTS OF CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION AND CONTROL ON
DIVISION RISK-TAKING STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE

by

HAERYONG KIM
B.A. February 1990, Yeungnam University. Korea
M.S. February 1992, Yeungnam University. Korea

A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty o f
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment o f the
Requirement for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
September 1998

Approved by:

.ae H. Chung (Director)

Sara A. Morris (Member)

G. Steven Rhiel (Member)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ABSTRACT

THE EFFECTS OF CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION AND CONTROL ON
DIVISION RISK-TAKING STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE

Hae Ryong Kim
Old Dominion University. 1998
Director: Dr. Kae H. Chung

This research explored two major functions o f corporate strategic managem ent,
corporate diversification (core-business relatedness) and corporate control, and their
implications for divisional strategic management. Four research questions were raised to
address these issues: (1) does core-business relatedness matter to division performance?
(2) how does core-business relatedness influence corporate control? (3) how does corebusiness relatedness influence division risk-taking strategies and performance? and (4)
how does corporate control influence division risk-taking strategies and performance?
Adopting the resource-based view and organizational learning theory, this study
proposed that core-business related divisions w ould outperform unrelated divisions and
that core-business related divisions would have higher commitment to risk-taking
strategies than would unrelated divisions. From a strategic management perspective, it
was hypothesized that corporate control would be differentiated by core-business
relatedness. Viewing the relationship between a corporate office and its divisions from
an agency theoretical perspective, this study suggested that corporate control would
influence division risk-taking strategy. Finally, from a strategic management perspective.
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this study proposed the moderating effects o f core-business relatedness and corporate
control on the relationship between division risk-taking strategy and performance.
Korean business groups were selected as samples because they provided objective
divisional performance data. Data was collected from 57 affiliated com panies o f 32
Korean business groups. Two indicators o f risk-taking strategy were used to test the
hypotheses: R&D investment and internationalization. T-test. analysis o f variance,
analysis o f covariance, and multiple regression analysis were used to test the hypotheses.
The results show that core-business relatedness positively influences division
performance. Core-business relatedness was found to positively affect divisional R&D
investment but not divisional internationalization. Corporate control was found to be not
differentiated by core-business relatedness. The moderating effect o f core-business
relatedness on the relationship between division risk-taking strategies and performance
was not found. The results show that decentralized corporate control positively
influenced division R&D investment. In contrast, centralized corporate control positively
influenced division internationalization. The moderating effect o f corporate control was
not found.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ACKNOW LEDGM ENTS

This dissertation is a result o f the guidance and support o f several people who
helped me shape my research mind and complete my doctoral program. I am pleased to
acknowledge their contributions here.
I am most grateful to Dr. Kae H. Chung, my committee director, for his constant
encouragement on my research achievement and for guidance in the completion o f this
dissertation research. I have been associated with him as his research assistant and as a
doctoral student under his advising. It was mainly thanks to his guidance that I have been
able to successfully complete the program. I am also grateful to Dr. Sara A. Morris and
Dr. G. Steven Rhiel for serving on my dissertation committee. Associations with them
made my research capability to be matured.
1 would like to acknowledge the financial support provided by the Korean
Economic Research Institute for this research project. I also would like to thank Dr.
M ahnsoon Kwack at the institute for his comments on my research and for help in
collecting research data.
I am also thankful to some other professors. Dr. Brian K. Boyd trained me to
achieve my present research capabilities and to broaden my views o f strategic
management. Dr. Chiduk Har and Dr. Chisoo Kim at Yeungnam University provided me
with constant support.
I would like to acknowledge the help from my colleagues at Old Dominion
University: Marla Howard provided invaluable feedback on my research; Dr. W. Otto
Carroll. Dave Loney. Elke Reuning-Elliott. and Sherry Burlingame encouraged me to get

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

through my doctoral program.
Finally. I would especially acknowledge the support and encouragement o f my
family. My wife. Eun Young, has sacrificed her past five years while 1 have gone
through the program: my children. Taewon and Seohee. have supported me by providing
their beautiful love: and my parents and parent-in-laws have always prayed for my
completion. To them I dedicate my dissertation.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF T A B L E S ....................................................................................................................... iv
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... vi
Chapter
I

IN T R O D U C T IO N ........................................................................................................

1

Previous Research ...............................................................................................
3
Research Site ......................................................................................................... 16
Organization o f the Dissertation ........................................................................ 17
II

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES .............................................................................. 18
Conceptual Models and Constructs ................................................................... 18
Theoretical Linkages ........................................................................................... 30

III

RESEARCH METHODS .......................................................................................... 55
Sample and Data ................................................................................................... 55
Measurements ..........................................................................................................60
Statistical Analysis ............................................................................................... 77

IV

RESULTS .................................................................................................................... 86
Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................................ 86
Results o f Testing Hypotheses ............................................................................. 86

V

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION ..................................................................

Ill

Discussion o f Main Findings ........................................................................... I l l
Theoretical Implications ................................................................................... 127
Managerial Implications ................................................................................... 130
Limitations o f the Study .................................................................................... 132
Suggestion for Future Study ............................................................................ 133
Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 134
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

137

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
Page
APPENDICES
A. SUBJECTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY .....................................................

153

B. QUESTIONNAIRE .....................................................................................................

157

VITA

.......................................................................................................................................

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

165

LIST OF TABLES
TABLE

PAGE

2-1

Expected Configurations o f Corporate Control ........................................................

27

3-1

Industry Membership o f Respondents' Firms ............................................................

58

3-2

Summary of Scales ........................................................................................................

64

3-3

Corporate Control Type Resulting From Cluster Analysis ...................................

66

3-4

Characteristics o f Clusters ............................................................................................

66

3-5

Summary o f Variables and Data Analytic Techniques for Research Hypotheses . . 82

3-6

Summary of M easures ..................................................................................................

85

4-1

Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations o f the Variables in the S tu d y ...............

87

4-2

T-test for Division Performance ..................................................................................

88

4-3

T-test for Corporate Control

4-4

Analysis o f Covariance for the Relationship between Core-business
Relatedness and R&D Investment ..............................................................................

......................................................................................... 89

91

4-5

Two-factor Analysis o f Variance for R&D Investment .......................................... 92

4-6

Three-factor Analysis o f Variance for Internationalization ...................................

93

4-7

Regression Analysis for Moderating Effects o f Core-business
Relatedness ......................................................................................................................

94

4-8

Comparisons o f Estimated Regression Lines .............................................................. 98

4-9

Analysis o f Covariance for the Relationship between Corporate
Control and R&D Investment ......................................................................................... 99

4-10 Regression Analysis for the Relationship between Financial and
Operating Control and Risk-taking Strategies .......................................................... 102
4-11 Regression Analysis for Moderating Effects o f Corporate Control

.....................

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

105

V

LIST OF TABLES (continued)
TABLE

PAGE

4-12 Regression Analysis for Moderating Effects o f Financial Control

.......................

106

4-13 Regression Analysis for Moderating Effects o f Operating Control ......................

108

4-14 Summary o f Testing Hypotheses
5-1

............................................................................... 109

Corporate Control Types between Core Business and Non-core Business
Divisions ........................................................................................................................ 115

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

LIST OF FIGURES
F IG U R E

PAGE

2-1

Conceptual Models of the Study

.................................................................................... 19

3-1

Models for Statistical Tests

4-1

Results o f the Tukey Method o f M ultiple Comparisons ...............................................97

............................................................................................. 78

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Diversification has been an important strategic option for many firms in
industrialized countries. Rumelt (1982) observed that by 1970 over two-thirds o f the US
Fortune 500 firms were highly diversified and other studies showed similar trends in
European countries. Asian countries, and other industrial nations (Chang & Choi. 1988:
Channon. 1973: Dyas & Thanheiser. 1976: Suzuki. 1985). It has been suggested that
large firms first expand their operations geographically, then integrate vertically, and
finally diversify their product offerings (Chandler. 1962; Rumelt. 1974). As firms*
diversification strategies change, so do the structures and internal control systems
reflecting the relationships between the corporate office and divisions (Chandler. 1962:
Williamson. 1975).
In diversified corporations, corporate-level decisions are related to two major
questions: in what businesses should the company invest its resources? and how should
the corporate office influence and relate to the divisions under its control? (Goold.
Campbell. & Alexander, 1994; Grant, 1996) The first corporate-level decision is
concerned with issues related to diversification, acquisition, divestment, and the
allocation o f resources between different businesses. These activities form a major part
o f corporate strategic management but the roles and responsibilities o f corporate strategic
management extend much further. Equally important is the administrative role of
corporate management in formulating and implementing business strategy at the
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divisional level and in coordinating activities between the divisions o f the company.
Most studies on diversified firms have addressed these two major issues (diversification
and corporate control) jointly or independently (e.g.. Govindarajan. 1988: Porter. 1980:
Rumelt. 1974).
Recognizing the importance o f these two m ajor functions o f corporate strategic
management, the present research studies the effects o f these two variables on the
management o f divisions. More specifically, it explores the relationships among a
division's relatedness or unrelatedness to the core business, corporate control type,
division risk-taking strategy, and division performance. Core-business relatedness refers
to the degree to which a division's business is related to a firm 's primary business.
Corporate control type refers to the relationship in which a corporate office establishes
with its divisions. These main constructs are conceptualized fully in Chapter 2. To
achieve the research purpose, this research raises the following four questions:

1. Does relatedness to the core business matter to division performance?
2. How does core-business relatedness influence corporate control type?
3. How does core-business relatedness influence a division's risk-taking strategies and its
performance?
4. How does corporate control type influence a division's risk-taking strategies and its
performance?

The theoretical frameworks o f this study are based on several perspectives: the
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resource-based view (Barney. 1991: Wemerfelt. 1984). organizational learning (Argyris
& Schon. 1978: Leavitt & March. 1988). agency theory (Eisenhardt. 1989). and strategic
fit (Hill & Hoskisson. 1987: Gupta. 1987). The resource-based view and the
organizational learning perspective have been adopted to explain the relationship between
core-business relatedness and a division's activities and between core-business
relatedness and a division's performance. Agency theory is adopted to explain the
relationship between corporate offices and divisions. A strategic fit perspective is used to
explain the relationship between core-business relatedness and corporate control type. It
also explains the effect o f corporate control type and the effect o f core-business
relatedness on the relationship between a division's risk-taking strategies and its
performance.

Previous Research
Core-business Relatedness and Performance
As diversification has increasingly become a popular strategic option for many
companies, so has interest in studying the relationship between diversification and
performance. Since the seminal research o f Rumelt (1974), a number o f studies have
attempted to clarify the relationship between diversification and corporate performance
(Bettis. 1981: Christensen & Montgomery. 1981; Dubofsky & Varadarajan. 1989:
Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1991: Palepu. 1985: Varadarajan & Ramanujam. 1987). Despite
a large volume o f research on the issue, the research findings on the effects o f
diversification strategies on corporate performance continue to be fragmentary’ and
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controversial (Ramanujam & Varadarajan. 1989). The inconclusivity o f these results is
caused by possible spuriousness o f observed relationships resulting from the problems
associated with the unit o f analysis and industry effects (Dess. Gupta. Hennart. & Hill.
1995: Ramanujam & Varadarajan. 1989).
As for the unit o f analysis, most studies on diversification have typically focused
on the corporate level when investigating the relationship o f diversification and
performance (e.g.. M ontgomery. 1985; Rumelt. 1974). Some researchers, however,
assert that the proper unit o f analysis should be at the individual business unit or
divisional level rather than at the corporation level (Dess et al.. 1995). If there is any
value that can be created by a corporate diversification strategy, it is at the individual
business level where its effect will be m ost apparent. For example, in a diversified firm,
the value o f relatedness realized at some divisions can be offset by the financial problems
o f divisions not related to its core business. In this case, the effect o f relatedness cannot
be captured when measuring perform ance at the corporation level, although, in fact, there
is an effect.
Porter (1987) notes that it is not a diversified firm but its business units that
compete in the individual markets. Davis and his colleagues (1992) indicated that
research on the relationship between relatedness and performance generally provide little
understanding o f strategy formulation and implementation issues within the context o f the
business-level, product-market arena within which corporate business units compete. As
a result, very little is known about the effect o f relatedness on performance o f business
units or divisions.
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Regarding the issue o f industry effects, subsequent researchers have suggested
that the superior profitability o f related constrained firms in R um elt's (1974) study may
have been a function o f industry membership, not a function o f diversification strategy.
These researchers point out that performance is particularly sensitive to industry
conditions. For example. Christensen and Montgomery (1981) found that Rumelt's
(1974) findings may be a reflection o f systematic industry' market structure differences
across the diversification categories. Bettis and Hall (1982) indicated that the relatedconstrained diversification category found most profitable in R um elt's (1974) study is
predominated by one particular industry (pharmaceuticals). Rumelt (1982) found in his
later work that the high profitability o f related constrained firms in his sample was due to
industry effects. Despite the evidence o f industry effects presented, many following
researchers did not control for industry' effects when investigating the diversificationperformance relationship (e.g., Amit & Livnat. 1988; M ichel & Shaked. 1984). Dess and
his colleagues (1995) and Ramanujam and Varadarajan (1989) pointed out that the results
o f the research that did not control the industry effects may be spurious and may
contribute to the inconclusivity in research findings on the diversification-performance
relationship.
Recognizing these two vital issues in previous empirical research, the present
study considered relatedness from the perspective o f a division. By focusing on the
divisional level, spuriousness from the unit o f analysis problem will be prevented. At the
divisional level, the possible industry effects can be controlled by narrowly defined
industry markets. Since a diversified firm participates in several businesses, defining
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industry at the divisional level makes it possible to capture the differences in industry
conditions between individual businesses within a corporation. The study also focuses on
the core-business relatedness o f divisions in the corporation. The concept o f core
business has been emphasized in the studies o f corporate strategy (e.g.. Goold. Campbell.
& Alexander. 1994). It is suggested that relatedness to the core business is a good
direction for corporate restructuring (Goold & Luchs. 1993). Thus, the specific research
question raised in this study would be whether divisions related to a firm 's core business
outperform divisions not related to the core business. By providing insights at the
divisional level, especially the core-business relatedness o f divisions, the current study
expands the existing perspective on relatedness and advances our understanding o f the
relationship between corporate diversification and performance.

Core-business Relatedness and Corporate Control Type
The second major research question is concerned with the relationship between
core-business relatedness and corporate control type. Strategy research on
multidivisional companies has stressed the impact o f corporate diversification on
organizational structure in terms of control type (e.g.. Hill & Hoskisson. 1987:
Hoskisson. 1987). The structures o f large diversified firms have evolved from simple
functional arrangement to multidivisional forms (Chandler. 1962: Rumelt. 1974). As a
business firm grows by expanding its product lines or areas, it faces problems o f
coordination and control. Chandler (1962) and W illiamson (1975. 1985) contend that the
multidivisional structure is an innovative response to those problems. A multidivisional

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

organization consists o f a separate corporate office and a number o f operating divisions
organized on the basis o f products, markets, geographic areas, or some com bination of
these dimensions. Today, the multidivisional structure appears to have become the
dominant organizational arrangement for large diversified firms in developed nations
(Chandler. 1962; Chang & Choi. 1988; Channon. 1973; Franko. 1974; Rumelt. 1974;
Steer & Cable. 1978; Suzuki. 1985).
In response to the popularity o f corporate diversification, researchers have focused
on the effects o f corporate diversification on organizational structure. It has been
suggested that a diversified firm can be m anaged to realize economies o f scope associated
with related diversification or internal m arket economies associated with unrelated
diversification (Hill & Hoskisson. 1987). Corporate-level managers in highly diversified
firms—those w ith an unrelated diversification strategy—generally focus on the
development and operation of an internal capital market that does not seek synergistic
relationships am ong divisions (Dundas & Richardson. 1982). They generally have little
first-hand knowledge o f industries or geographic regions in which their divisions compete
and the technology that they use. Thus, for the purpose o f allocating capital and
incentives, they tend to focus attention alm ost exclusively on financial results and not on
promoting operating synergies among the different businesses.
In contrast, dominant business firms and related-diversified firms focus on
creating operating synergy stemming from econom ies o f scope and sharing organizational
resources between business units or divisions (Teece, 1982). They emphasize resource
sharing and employ incentives to improve overall firm performance. They also exercise
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corporate control in order to seek operating synergies on the basis o f operational
knowledge o f the division's businesses. The emphasis on corporate control for synergies,
resource sharing and incentives to improve overall firm perform ance leads to a longerterm performance.
Most research has attem pted to distinguish one diversified firm from the other by
the number o f segments in which the firm operates and the relative importance o f each
segment to total firm sales (e.g.. Rumelt. 1974: Palepu. 1985). The diversified firm as a
whole was the unit o f analysis in investigating the relationship between diversification
strategy and control type in which a corporate office manages its divisions. Control type
was considered from the perspective o f the corporate office. It has been thought o f as the
relationship o f the corporate office with all o f its divisions.
However, the approach that researchers have taken can be justified only if all o f a
firm 's divisions are managed with the same control system or if variances in the control
system between divisions in a multidivisional firm are so small that they can be
disregarded. Research on diversification and corporate control systems suggests that
differentiated control approaches may be adopted across divisions within a firm (Goold &
Campbell. 1987; Gupta. 1987; Hamermesh & White. 1984). They argued that
differentiated control approaches improve corporate perform ance by realizing
performance improvement opportunities that exist within divisions. The nature o f those
opportunities varies from one business to another.
The adoption o f differentiated control approaches by the corporate office may be
encouraged by a particular organizational structure. In firms with many divisions, a new
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hierarchical layer called the 'sectoral executive' is often created to reduce the span o f
control o f the corporate office (Galbraith & Kazanjian. 1986). In this minigroup system,
the appropriate location for staff influence and decision making is likely to be the sector
level rather than the corporate level. Also, this sectoral approach o f a corporation
controlling its constituent divisions is likely to lead to differentiated control types for
each o f the sectors. As a result, some variances in control approaches to first-line
divisions within a firm can be easily observed from this kind o f divisional structure.
Considering the importance o f differentiated control approaches, the present study
considers corporate control type from the perspective o f the division.

It focuses on the

relationship between the corporate office and each individual division rather than on the
relationship between a corporate office and all o f its divisions. The present study
examines how core-business relatedness influences the control type o f a corporate office
to its division.

Core-business Relatedness, Division Risk-taking Strategy, and Performance
Rumelt (1974) conjectured that related firms participate in industries
characterized by opportunities for product differentiation and market segmentation.
Bettis (1981) found that related firms spent significantly more for advertising than did
unrelated firms and that related firms were able to achieve higher returns for research and
development. Although the interrelationship between relatedness and strategic activities
was identified and speculated upon, very little is known about the reason why relatedness
is pertinent to certain strategic activities such as research and development and how
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relatedness influences the relationship between strategic activities and performance.
Since the unit o f analysis has been mainly the diversified firm as a whole, little has been
known about the causal relationship among relatedness, strategic activities, and
performance at the divisional level. The present study attempts to explain the
relationship between relatedness, a division's risk-taking, and performance. The strategic
fit perspective on synergy and the resource-based view focusing on firm-specific assets
and skills give some insights into understanding how core-business relatedness influences
a division's risk-taking strategy and performance.
Much o f strategic management literature has stressed that an essential component
o f corporate-level strategy is the maximization o f operating synergy as opposed to
financial synergy among business units or divisions (Ansoff. 1965; Kanter. 1989; Porter.
1985). Operating synergy is created when business units or divisions support and
complement each other in their competitive efforts (Porter. 1980). Business units can
capture operating synergies from areas with some common core skills or resources.
Sharing resources and capabilities between divisions or business units on the basis o f
common core factors enable them to accumulate firm-specific resources and skills
(Porter. 1985; Rumelt. 1982).
Recently, firm-specific assets and capabilities have been emphasized in the
resource-based view o f the firm. This perspective characterizes the firm as a collection o f
unique skills and capabilities that influence the firm 's evolution and strategic growth
(Barney. 1991; Wenerfelt. 1984). Researchers following this view suggest that a firm 's
peculiar pattern o f assets (tangible and intangible) have important effects on its strategic
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ability (Mahoney & Pandian. 1992). They also suggest that a unique set o f resources and
skills is nurtured and developed from collective learning in the organization (D iBella &
Nevis. 1998: Prahalad & Hamel. 1990). Organizational learning becomes
institutionalized over time and thus becomes part o f a firm 's knowledge creating system.
It is suggested that environmental uncertainty is reduced because o f knowledge
accumulated through the learning process (Lei. Hitt. & Bettis. 1996).
Based on the relationship between relatedness and firm-specific assets and skills
suggested in prior studies, the present study asserts that divisions related to the core
business show a more positive attitude toward risk than divisions unrelated to the core
business. This is because firm-specific assets (tangible and intangible) are likely to help
divisions discover new opportunities for product and process innovation. It is also
because greater and diverse knowledge from collective learning reduces anxiety
associated with environm ent uncertainty. This study further argues that divisions related
to the core business are likely to be under a more favorable internal environm ent in
implementing risk-taking strategies. The rationale is that the knowledge base formulated
through collective learning improves a division's ability to obtain potential gains from its
risk-taking strategies. Coordination activities between related divisions also improve
their abilities in implementing risk-taking strategies by sharing resources and knowledge
for strategic success. Specifically, this study focuses on the main effect o f core-business
relatedness on a division's attitude toward risk and the moderating effect o f relatedness
on the relationship between a division's risk-taking strategy and its performance. These
issues will be discussed fully in the next chapter.
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Corporate Control, Division Risk-taking Strategy, and Performance
The last research question o f this study is concerned with the relationship among
corporate control, division risk-taking strategy, and division performance. Prior studies
have developed a theory for understanding corporate control in terms o f its effects on a
division's strategy (Bavsinger & Hoskisson. 1989: Hoskisson & Hitt. 1988). This issue
has attracted attention from investigators because it has been indicated that a firm 's risk
taking influences its competitiveness in the dom estic and international market and that
risk taking may be associated with corporate diversification and corporate control
system s (Leoscher. 1984; Young. 1985). Researchers have focused on the effects o f the
multidivisional structure on the division's risk-taking strategies (Hoskisson & Hitt. 1988).
Their arguments recognize the effects o f the multidivisional structure on division-level
m anagers' decision-making horizons and their attitudes toward risk.
These studies suggest that division managers operating within a multidivisional
form tend to avoid risky strategies and subsequently sacrifice long-term investments to
more immediate financial performance goals (Burgelman. 1983: Dearden. 1969: Dundas
& Richardson. 1982: Hayes & Abernathy, 1980; Hill. Hitt & Hoskisson. 1988: Hill &
Hoskisson. 1987; Jaeger & Baliga. 1985: Loescher. 1984: Norbum & Miller. 1981;
Rapapport. 1978; Solomon. 1964; Stonich. 1981). The basic argument is that in large,
diversified firms, corporate managers tend to use financial criteria for evaluating division
managers' performance because they generally have little first-hand knowledge o f the
operating intricacies, technology, or geographic regions of the division (Dundas &
Richardson. 1982). This encourages division managers to meet short-term financial
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objectives by reducing expenditures that are not essential for the attainment o f short-run
returns even though these expenditures may be critical to long-term organizational
performance. In short, division managers tend to avoid risk and to favor investments
with predictable returns (Hoskisson & Hitt. 1988: Jaeger & Baliga. 1985).
Focusing on the effects o f corporate control on division m anagers' decision
making horizons and attitudes toward risk, prior research has investigated the
relationships between corporate diversification, corporate control type, and a division's
risk taking (Baysinger & Hoskisson. 1989: Hoskisson & Hitt. 1988). However, that prior
research has several limitations. First, the attention o f previous research has been limited
to the comparison o f m anagers' attitudes toward risk between firms with a functional
structure (U-form) and multidivisional structure (M-form). U-form firms are organized
along functional lines. The principal operating units in the U-form firm are the functional
divisions—sales. finance, manufacturing (Williamson. 1975). Prior studies share the basic
argument that the differences in risk taking between two organization forms result from
the differences in corporate control type used in organizations. The tight financial control
associated with M-form structure results in an increased emphasis on short-term
efficiency. This emphasis, in turn, leads to a division's preferences against risk taking.
However, it has been argued that variations in corporate control type can be observed not
only between U-form and M-form but also within various M-form firms (Hill. 1988:
Lorsch & Allen. 1973: Markides & Williamson. 1996: W illiamson. 1975).
For example. Williamson(1975) proposed a classification scheme that included
five different forms o f divisional structure: the holding company form, the
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multidivisional form, the transitional multidivisional form, the corrupted multidivisional
form, and the mixed form. Agreeing to the existence o f several forms o f divisional
structure. Hill (1988) proposed three major types o f multidivisional structure according to
the corporate control type adopted in divisionalized firms: 'pure M -form' or 'full Mform.' 'centralized M -form ' or 'corrupted M-form." and 'H -form .' Nevertheless, prior
studies on the relationship o f corporate control type and a division's risk taking did not
investigate the differences in a division's risk taking between M-form firms with different
types o f corporate control.
Second, prior studies did not distinguish one divisional structure (pure M-form)
from other divisional structures (centralized M-form and H-form) (Hoskisson. Hill. &
Kim. 1993). They used archival data or survey data from simple questions about physical
organizational structure in classifying firms as the pure M-form or not. While the basic
structural arrangement o f a firm can generally be discerned from published material or
from a categorical measure o f the physical organizational structure, the same cannot be
said for the corporate control type involving the internal decision-making and control
apparatus (Hill. 1988: Hoskisson et al.. 1993; Williamson. 1975). Therefore, the previous
research might be exposed to a classification error, an overassignm ent to one type o f
divisional structure, the pure M-form. Consequently, their results might be contaminated
by this methodological limitation.
Third, in prior studies, the unit o f analysis is the diversified firm as a whole.
Those studies analyzed the control approach at the corporate office level and measured its
effect on a divisions' attitude toward risk at the diversified firm level rather than at the
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divisional level. As noted previously, differentiated control approaches may be adopted in
multidivisional firms. Considering the importance o f using differentiated control
approaches, this study points out that control type perceived at the division is appropriate
for representing the relationship between the corporate office and a division. Thus, the
relationship between corporate control and a division's attitudes toward risk should be
explored at the divisional level. Corporate control measured at the corporate level may
fail to reflect variances o f control type across divisions within a diversified firm.
Fourth, also an important but underexplored issue is the impact o f corporate
control on the relationship between a division's risk-taking strategies and its perform ance.
In the strategic m anagem ent literature, it has been argued that, for better perform ance, a
division-level strategy must be implemented with the structural form and organizational
processes consistent with the economic and competitive logic o f that strategy (Hill &
Hoskisson. 1987; Govindarajan & Fisher. 1990). On the basis o f this argument, many
researchers have studied the impacts o f internal decision-m aking and control systems on
the relationship between a division's strategy and its perform ance (Golden. 1992;
Govindarajan. 1986. 1988; Govindarajan & Gupta. 1985; Gupta. 1987; Gupta &
Govindarajan. 1986). For example, Govindarajan (1988) found that emphasizing
budgetary goals during performance assessment influences positively the effectiveness o f
the division employing a low cost strategy but influences negatively the effectiveness o f
the division pursuing a differentiation strategy. Gupta (1987) found that decentralization
o f operating decisions gives a positive impact to a division's implementation o f the
differentiation strategy. Given that the nature o f a firm 's risk-taking strategic behavior
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can significantly influence performance and that a division's strategy implementation
may be influenced by the control system adopted by the corporate office, a theory for
explaining the relationship between corporate control, division risk-taking strategy, and
division performance needs to be developed.
Recognizing the importance o f the aforementioned research issues, especially the
underexplored relationships, coupled with the limitations o f prior studies, this study
intends to examine the relationships among core-business relatedness, corporate control
type, division risk-taking strategies, and division financial performance. The present
study extends the previous research by developing a theoretical framework for explaining
how corporate diversification influences divisions risk-taking strategy and perform ance
and how corporate control type influences division risk-taking strategy and performance.

Research Site
Korean business groups are selected for this study for the following reasons.
First, they are large and highly diversified, allowing the study of the relationship between
corporate office and its affiliated business units possible. Unlike U.S. conglomerates,
which own affiliated companies, the business units affiliated with a Korean business
group are legally independent and registered on the stock market separately. And yet.
these affiliated companies are controlled by the corporate office for the purpose o f group
level planning and coordination as if they are parts (or operating divisions) o f a firm. The
reason is that these affiliated companies are mostly owned and managed by the founder's
family (Jung, 1987; Lee & Yoo, 1987; Ungson. Steers, & Park. 1997). Considering this
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characteristic, prior studies have considered the Korean business group as one large firm
with a multidivisional structure (Chang & Choi. 1988: Cho. 1994: Jung. 1989; Kang.
1990).
Second, in analyzing a Korean business group as a multidivisional structure, a
division corresponds to an affiliated firm. Since affiliated firms are legally independent,
publishing independent performance data, objective data on risk-taking strategies and
financial performance can be obtained and used to test relevant hypotheses. In contrast,
because in the U.S.. divisions are parts o f a diversified firm, objective perform ance data
from divisions are not available. Such inaccessibility o f objective data from the
divisional level is a major hindrance for studying divisional level strategic activities and
performance in the U.S. (Gupta. 1987).

Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized into four parts: theoretical development, research
methods, results, and discussion. Chapter I introduces research questions and issues.
Chapter II presents conceptual models, explains the expected relationships in the
conceptual models, and presents the hypotheses to be tested. Chapter III presents
research methods used to test the hypotheses. This chapter includes the study's sample
and data, measurement, and data analytic techniques employed. Chapter IV reports
empirical results. Lastly. Chapter V discusses the implications o f the findings on
strategic management research and managerial implications for practitioners. The
limitations o f this study and some directions for future research are also discussed.
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CHAPTER II
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

The primary purpose o f this chapter is to present theoretical linkages between
constructs that are related to the research questions raised in Chapter I and to draw
hypotheses to be tested. To this end. the chapter starts with conceptual models and
constructs that provide the basis for developing the theoretical linkages. As noted in
Chapter I. the present study is concerned with the influence o f core-business relatedness
and corporate control type on a division's risk-taking strategy and its performance. Two
sets o f theoretical linkages are advanced to answer the research questions. The first set
deals with the concept o f core-business relatedness, its relationships with division
performance, corporate control type, and risk-taking strategy, and its moderating effect on
the relationship between division risk-taking strategy and performance. The second set
deals with corporate control type, its relationships with division risk-taking strategy, and
its moderating effect on the relationship between risk-taking strategy and performance. A
set o f hypotheses is drawn from these theoretical linkages.

Conceptual Models and Constructs
Conceptual Models
The conceptual models used to operationalize the research questions in the study
are shown in Figure 2-1. Model A indicates the relationship between core-business
relatedness and division performance. Model B presents the relationship between core-
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FIG U R E 2-1
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FIGURE 2-1 (continued)
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business relatedness and corporate control type. Model C shows how core-business
relatedness influence a division's risk-taking strategy and its performance. Model D
depicts the relationships among corporate control type, division risk-taking strategy, and
division performance. Detailed explanations for these conceptual models will be
presented in a later section that deals with theoretical linkages.
Although it is not the purpose o f this study to develop and test an integrative
model, an attempt can be made to show plausible linkages among core-business
relatedness, corporate control type, risk-taking behavior, and performance (see Model E).
The present study develops and tests theoretical linkages between constructs by showing
their statistical associations instead of developing and testing an integrative model. The
main reason for this choice is that testing an integrative model requires unbiased path

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

21

coefficients between all variables that are causes o f an endogenous variable or are
correlated with other endogenous variables (James. 1980). When key variables are
omitted, it may lead to erroneous results (James & Singh. 1978). The difficulty o f
including all relevant variables in testing an integrative model constitutes a main reason
why we do not see much integrative research in strategic management literature,
especially inter-level studies investigating the relationships between corporate and
divisional levels (Dess et al.. 1995).
This study does not include all relevant variables that are causes o f endogenous
variables. For example, business environment, industry growth stage, and top
managem ent's values can influence a firm 's risk-taking strategy but these variables are
not included in the present study. Firms operating in uncertain environments are more
likely to experiment with an innovative risk-taking strategy (Paine & Anderson. 1977).
An industry's growth stage can influence risk-taking strategy (Hambrick & Lei. 1985).
Top managers' value systems also influence organizational risk-taking behaviors.
Managers who value innovation are more likely to be more active in creating and
utilizing an organization's innovative capacity (Cummings. 1965: Mohr. 1969: Pierce &
Delbecq. 1977). Hage and Dewar (1973) demonstrated that the values o f managerial
elites explain more o f the variance in innovation than any single structural dimension.
Exclusion o f these variables make the development and testing o f an integrated model
problematic.
Why. then, are these variables not included in this study? The answer is that the
development and testing o f an integrative model is beyond the scope o f this study. The
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purpose o f this study is to answer the four major research questions stated in Chapter I.
which can be answered by testing the theoretical linkages associated with the four
conceptual models. The findings o f this study, however, can provide som e insights into
the development of an integrative model by showing the direction o f critical linkages
between key variables. The following section presents the major constructs used in the
developm ent o f conceptual models and related theoretical linkages.

Corporate Domain Constructs
In order to test the statistical associations between various constructs in the
conceptual models, theoretical linkages between them need to be developed. Before such
theoretical linkages are developed, we need to clearly define each o f the constructs used
in the conceptual models. There are basically four major constructs that are used in the
conceptual models: core-business relatedness, corporate control type, division risk-taking
strategy, and division performance. The first two are related to the corporate domain: the
last two are related to the divisional level.
Core-business Relatedness.

Core business can be defined as one or a few

industries in which a firm 's core competencies or expertise are exploited (Goold et al..
1994). This broad definition raises a fundamental question. How can the core business
be identified in multibusiness com panies? In strategic management literature, the answer
has been presented from two approaches. One approach focuses on the role o f the
original business(es) in the process o f business growth and diversification (e.g.. Chandler.
1962; Collis & Montgomery. 1997). The other approach focuses on the present principal
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business(es) in single, dominant, or multibusiness companies (e.g.. Rumelt. 1974). For
the purpose o f this study, core business is defined as the principal business! es) with a
firm 's core competencies or expertise. It can be easily observed in firms with a single
business or dominant business and to some extent in firms with related diversification.
All or m ost o f their business activities are conducted in relation to their primary
industries. Core businesses can also be found in firms with unrelated diversification.
Their businesses can be clustered around multiple core businesses, but the required
accum ulation o f knowledge and skills for each o f these core businesses can be
overwhelm ing. Core businesses o f these firms can be identified by the relative
im portance o f each individual business in the overall corporate business portfolio and by
the accumulated knowledge about each business.
The concept o f core-business relatedness concentrates on the potential for creating
synergies from sharing organizational activities and resources.

Relatedness is defined by

the degree to which business units or divisions support and/or complem ent each other's
activities (Davis et al, 1992: Rumelt. 1974). Relatedness among divisions or business
units basically comes from two sources: transferring skills or expertise and sharing
resources and activities (Porter. 1987). Relatedness can be exploited in various valuechain activities, but production and marketing have been main targets for achieving
synergies stemming from core-business relatedness (Ansoff. 1965: Davis et al. 1992:
Porter. 1985: Rumelt. 1974).
Corporate Control Type.

Control is defined as any process in which a person,

group, or organization intentionally affects the behavior o f another person, group, or
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organization (Tannenbaum. 1968). In divisionalized organizations, a hierarchy o f control
can be seen at three levels: corporate, division, and functional. At the corporate level,
control focuses on maintaining a balance among the various activities o f divisions to
achieve the corporate objectives. At the divisional level, control is primarily concerned
with maintenance and improvement o f the division's com petitive position. Lastly, at the
functional level, the role o f control is to develop and enhance functionally-based
distinctive competencies (Lorange. Morton. & Ghoshal. 1986).
In this study, corporate control type (corporate control hereafter) is defined by the
relationship between the corporate office and its divisions (Hill. 1988). The relationship
between a corporate office and its divisions has attracted some attention from strategystructure theorists and organizational economists. Strategy-structure theorists reported
that corporate diversification is associated with divisional structure (Chandler. 1962;
Rumelt. 1974). high decentralization (Vancil. 1979). and performance-based incentive
systems (Pitts. 1974). On the other hand, organizational economists focused on the
internal decision-making and control apparatus for understanding the variances between
divisionalized organizations (Williamson. 1975). More recently, there has been an effort
to integrate these two approaches. Based on these two perspectives. Hill (1988)
identified three main corporate control dimensions: strategic, financial, and operating.
- Strategic control: the term "strategic control" means different things to different
people (Schreyogg & Steinmann. 1987). Some regard strategic control as activities
designed to direct strategic plans and evaluate strategic results (Doz & Prahalad. 1981;
Lorange et al., 1986), while others refer to it as a critical evaluation o f strategic domain.
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premise about internal and external environment, and the process o f strategy
implementation, thereby providing information for future strategic action (Schrevogg &
Steinmann. 1987). These definitions focus on the traditional review and feedback stage
which constitutes the last step in the strategic management process.
In this study, strategic control is conceptualized differently from the general
concept o f strategic control mentioned above. Borrowing from H ill's (1988) concept o f
corporate control, strategic control is considered as one o f the dimensions that is used to
assess the corporate-division relationship. As a dimension of corporate control, strategic
control deals with the basic strategic direction o f the division. It is through strategic
control that the division develops a competitive strategy within parameters established by
corporate-level strategists. Strategic control is basically concerned with the extent to
which a corporate office defines the range and scope o f its divisions' strategic initiatives.
For example, portfolio planning techniques are usually used by a corporate office o f the
unrelated diversified company to evaluate the competitive positions o f subunits and
resource allocation decisions (Hill, 1988). Divisions may differ in the range o f corporate
control activities and in the degree o f responsibility (or intervention) their corporate
offices chooses to exercise.
- Financial control: financial control is control based upon financial return criteria
(Ouchi. 1980). It involves setting clear financial targets for a business unit such as return
on investment, profit margin, and growth rate. Financial control has been used
interchangeably with market control in the literature (Hill. 1988). The nature o f financial
control varies across divisionalized enterprises (e.g.. Baysinger & Hoskisson. 1989;
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Goold & Campbell. 1987: G ovindarajan. 1988; Gupta & Govindarajan. 1984: Hill &
Hoskisson. 1987). Financial control contains two dimensions: the range o f specific
financial targets and the im portance given to each financial target. The relationship o f the
corporate office and divisions may be distinguished in terms o f the num ber o f specific
financial targets applied to the division. The range can be defined as the absolute
number o f functions which the corporate office uses for financial control. The second
dimension of financial control is the degree to which the corporate office pushes the
division to achieve financial targets.

It is reflected by the level o f em phasis that the

corporate office imposes on specific financial targets.
- Operating control: the operating control dimension refers to the extent to which
the corporate office is involved in the operations o f its divisions (Hill. 1988). The
operations include such activities as marketing, manufacturing, and so forth. The range
o f possible functional areas controlled by the corporate office may vary across divisions
in a corporation. Operating control contains two dimensions: range and degree. The
relationship between the corporate office and the division may be distinguished in terms
o f the range of operating control since some corporate offices seek control over certain
functional activities while others can seek control over all functions. The range of
operating control can be operationally defined as the absolute num ber o f operating
activities in which the corporate office intervenes. The other dim ension is the degree to
which the corporate office circum scribes divisional discretion. It reflects the attention
corporate offices gives to various operational activities.
- Configurations o f corporate control: Hill (1988) suggested that these control
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dimensions form configurations reflecting the internal decision-making and control
systems. These configurations characterize the relationships between the corporate
office and divisions. The corporate office can use any combination o f the three control
dimensions to establish relationships with their divisions. The specific configuration
depends on how multidivisional companies (M -form firms) differ in their internal
decision-making and control systems (W illiamson. 1975). For example, pure M-form
firms are likely to use strategic and financial controls but allow divisions to exercise
operational autonomy (Hill. 1988: Hoskisson et al.. 1993). Reflecting these differences
in the configuration o f the three control dim ensions, three types o f corporate control can
be identified: full, centralized, and laissez-faire (Hill. 1988). Table 2-1 summarizes the
configuration o f three types of corporate control.

TABLE 2-1
Expected Configurations of Corporate Control
Control Dimension
Financial

Type

Operating

Full corporate control

Decentralized

Used extensively

Used extensively

Centralized corporate
control

Centralized

Used moderately

Used moderately

Laissez-faire corporate
control

Decentralized

Little used

Little used

Strategic

Adapted from Hill (1988). p.406.
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(1) Full corporate control: This control type can be characterized by an
exclusive use o f financial and strategic controls and decentralization o f
operational decision-making. Divisionalized firms characterized by this kind o f
control type are classified as 'pure M -form firms' or 'competitive M -form firms'
(Hill. 1988; Hoskisson et al.. 1993). Those firms are consistent with
W illiam son's definition o f an M-form firm.
(2) Centralized corporate control: Under this control, corporate offices
centralize operating decisions but exercise moderate financial and strategic
controls. Firms adopting this type o f corporate control are classified as
'centralized M-form firms' (Hill. 1988). "cooperative M-form firm s' (Hoskisson
et al.. 1993). or 'corrupted M-form firm s' (Williamson. 1975).
(3) Laissez-faire corporate control: This control type is characterized by
the corporate office-division relationship that is based upon decentralization o f
operating decisions and a relatively m inimal use o f financial and strategic
controls. Divisionalized firms with this kind o f control type are classified as 'H form firms' (Hill. 1988; Williamson. 1975).

As indicated in Chapter I. within a multidivisional firm, a variety o f corporate
control types can be used simultaneously for different divisions. For example, full
corporate control can be used with divisions which are not related to the core business o f
the firm, whereas centralized control can be used with divisions which are closely related
with the firm 's core business. Williamson (1970. 1975) calls a divisionalized firm with

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

29
multiple approaches o f corporate control an X-form firm. This differentiated approach to
corporate control is essential to achieve organizational fits between diversification and
corporate control even in the same organization.

Division-related Constructs
In order to assess the influences o f core-business relatedness and corporate
control on the divisions o f a diversified firm, two constructs are presented in the
conceptual models - division performance and risk-taking strategy. These two constructs
are defined in this section.
Division Performance. For the purpose o f this study, division performance is
defined as financial results at the divisional level. This definition reflects the dominance
and legitimacy of the economic goals o f the firm. From a strategic management
perspective, a firm 's performance consists o f two domains: financial and operational
(Venkatraman & Ramanujam. 1986). Financial performance is typically expressed in
terms o f sales growth, return on investment, stock price, and others, and it is the
dominant concept in strategic management research (Hofer. 1983). Operational
performance is assessed in terms o f market share, productivity, technological efficiency,
and others.
Risk-taking Strategy.

Risk refers to a potential deviation from expected outcomes

(Arrow, 1971: Pratt, 1964). Risk-taking is then defined as the selection o f projects that
have varying degrees o f uncertainty associated with their outcomes (Bromiley. 1991:
Wright, Ferris, Sarin. & Awasthi. 1996). Based on these concepts o f risk and risk-taking.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30

division risk-taking strategy is defined as activities that divisional managers undertake in
light o f uncertainties associated with their strategic choices which may adversely affect
their divisional performance. In prior studies, risk-taking strategies were operationalized
in terms o f technological R&D expenditures (Bavsinger & Hoskisson. 1989: Hoskisson.
Hitt. & Hill. 1993). market research expenditures (Jaeger & Baliga. 1985). advertising
spending (Lee. 1994). capital expenditures (Jaeger & Baliga. 1985). and
internationalization (Broughthers. 1995: Shama. 1995).

Theoretical Linkages
In order to find theoretical linkages for the conceptual models, the following
theoretical perspectives are employed. The resource-based view and organizational
learning theory' are used to explain the relationship between core-business relatedness and
division performance. Contingency theory (more specifically, strategic fit concept) is
applied to find the linkage between core-business relatedness and corporate control.
Agency theory explains the relationship between corporate control and division risktaking strategy. A strategic fit perspective is used to gauge the effects o f core-business
relatedness and corporate control on the relationship between division risk-taking
strategy and performance. Based on these theoretical linkages, a set o f hypotheses are
drawn.

Core-business Relatedness and Division Performance
The resource-based view and organizational learning theory are useful
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frameworks for explaining the relationship between core-business relatedness and
performance. According to the resource-based view, a corporation is a collection o f
resources and capabilities (Peteraf. 1993). Resources can be physical and financial
tangible assets or intangible capacities to solve organizational and technological
problems. Rare and valuable resources that are difficult to imitate give a firm “core
competencies," w ith which the firm can successfully compete and perform (Barney.
1991; Prahalad & Hamel. 1990; Stalk. Evans. & Shulman. 1992). Core competencies
enable the firm to create potentially idiosyncratic strategic growth (Lei et al. 1996;
Prahalad & Hamel, 1990).
Organizational learning also adds to the firm 's core com petencies. Core
competencies o f the corporation can be built from organizational collective learning, by
which a firm can accumulate specific assets, core skills, technologies, and other
capabilities. For single or dominant business companies, collective learning centers on
their primary businesses. In the multibusiness company, core com petencies are achieved
in the learning process involving the corporate office that collects and disseminates
valuable knowledge and information. Core competencies can be built around a single
business unit, but its capacity to accumulate the needed competency is rather limited in
comparison with the corporate learning process, involving the corporate office and its
core-business related divisions. In the corporate learning process, the central office plays
the role o f guardian and promoter o f the core competencies o f the corporation (Goold et
al.. 1994). More importantly, the corporate office plays the role o f an organizational
memory system which supports the whole process o f organizational collective learning.
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Research suggests that no learning can take place in an organization unless it possesses a
proper memory system (Covington. 1981: Stein. 1989).
It is argued in the organizational learning literature that a knowledge base
resulting from collective learning is a critical factor affecting the firm 's performance.
Core competencies based on collective learning helps the firm understand the means o f
achieving competitive success in its business environment. Accumulated knowledge and
continuous learning can also help the firm reduce environmental uncertainty (Lei et al..
1996). Accumulated knowledge allows the firm to use its key capabilities to develop
potential growth alternatives that lower the investment costs o f expanding into new
markets or developing related products (Hitt. Hoskisson. & Ireland. 1994: Teece. Rumelt.
Dosi, & Winter, 1992). As a result, organizational learning may enable a firm to develop
new products and markets. More importantly, core competence from collective learning
enhances a firm 's long-term competitiveness (Reed & deFillippi. 1990).
Divisions related to the firm 's core business are more likely to benefit from the
firm 's core competencies than divisions unrelated to the firm's core business.
Furthermore, divisions with related businesses are more likely to transfer and share
knowledge and skills among themselves, thus creating a variety o f synergies—knowledge
transfer, sharing o f facilities and resources, and functional consolidations (Ansoff. 1965:
Amit & Livnat. 1988: Mahajan & Wind. 1988). Synergistic cooperation leads to internal
efficiency and thus to high profitability. For example, firms with related businesses may
use their core competencies (particular technical and managerial skills) to develop or
exploit new business opportunities or markets (Palepu. 1985; Rumelt, 1982). Operating
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synergies allow the firm to gain a cost advantage by accelerating the sharing o f
operational improvement ideas (Porter. 1985: Trussler. 1998). They may also enhance
differentiation in any activity o f the value chains by utilizing product and market
relatedness (Porter. 1985).
Unlike divisions that are unrelated to the core business, core-business related
divisions would be expected to create operating synergies and. in turn, yield superior
performance. That is because divisions unrelated to the core business have few core
competencies in common with other divisions or with the corporate office, while
divisions related to the core business share core competencies between and with the
corporate office. In divisions related to the core business, economies o f scope can be
achieved by conducting joint production and joint research and development between
divisions related to the core business. In sum. divisions related to the core business enjoy
the benefits of sharing and transferring core competencies with related business units.
Based on these observations, the following hypothesis can be drawn:

Hypothesis I: Divisions related to the core business outperform divisions not
related to the core business.

Core-business Reiatedness and Corporate Control
Diversification strategy begs another major corporate management question:
"How do multibusiness companies manage the diversity o f their operations?" In a
diversified company, some divisions are related to the firm 's core business, while others
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are not. The question is then: 'Should all divisions be treated alike or should they be
treated differentially?" Universalists (Weber. 1947; Fayol. 1949) might argue that there
should be one best way o f managing a firm 's divisions, while contingency theorists
(Chandler. 1962; Chakavarthy & Lorange. 1984; Drazin & Van de Ven. 1985;
Donaldson. 1987; Hoskisson. 1987) would suggest a differentiated approach. Since
Chandler (1962) provided the description o f the relationship between strategy and
structure, the notion o f fit between diversification strategy and structure has attracted
attention from strategic m anagem ent researchers (e.g.. Chakavarthy & Lorange. 1984;
Donaldson. 1987; Hoskisson. 1987). The literature on the strategv-structure fit is the
primary research thrust in strategic management literature (Hoskisson & Hitt. 1990). It
provides evidence that structural implementation is an important contributor to firm
performance.
Multidivisional firms can use two types o f diversification strategies to achieve
different economic benefits: (1) economies o f scope with related diversification and (2)
financial benefits with unrelated diversification (Hill & Hoskisson. 1987). Related
diversification increases opportunities to expand product lines and to create synergies
between related product divisions by sharing their resources and expertise. Unrelated
diversification increases opportunities to maximize corporate profits by adding profitable
product lines and by reducing unprofitable ventures. Financial gains are the primarymotive o f unrelated diversification.
Studies on strategic fit provide useful insights for examining the relationship
between core-business relatedness and corporate control. Researchers assert that
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economic benefits can be realized only if appropriate controls are in place (Hill. 1988:
Hill & Hoskisson. 1987: Kerr: 1985: Lorsch & Allen. 1973: Markides & W illiamson.
1996). According to them, when a firm tries to achieve economic benefits from
economies o f scale, it needs to centralize operational controls but reduce financial
controls. As a firm 's divisions are expanded around its dominant business, the corporate
office needs to closely coordinate the activities o f its divisions or business units. But as
the lines between divisions are blurred, it will be difficult to isolate the financial
contributions o f divisions independently, making divisionalized financial controls
impractical.
When a firm attempts to achieve synergistic benefits from related diversification,
it needs to closely coordinate the activities o f its divisions to share related resources and
expertise between related divisions (Hill & Hoskisson. 1987). Decentralized operations
do not produce synergistic benefits because they hinder the information flow and
resource sharing between related business units. The information flow helps firms
identify opportunities in one division that may have applications in other divisions.
Related diversification requires only a moderate level o f financial controls because such
tight controls would prevent divisions from cooperating with each other. Because the
performance o f related business units are interdependent, independent and objective
performance criteria cannot be established and imposed.
For divisions that are unrelated to the firm 's core business, the corporate office
may need extensive use o f financial controls coupled with the decentralization o f
operating authority and responsibilities. Because there is no operating synergy that can
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be achieved between the corporate office and its divisions and between unrelated
divisions, the corporate office requires minimal operational information from its
divisions. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that corporate managers are sufficiently
familiar with the businesses o f divisions that are not related to the firm ’s core business
(Baysinger & Hoskisson. 1989). As a result, it is imperative that these divisions are left
with operational autonomy. However, in order to achieve internal capital market
economies, tight financial control must be exercised. Tight financial controls encourage
divisional managers to maximize operational efficiency and corporate funds to be
channeled to high yield projects. A separation o f strategic and operating functions may
foster a psychological commitment on the part o f divisional managers to maximize
profitability (W illiamson. 1970. 1975). Based on these observations, the following
hypotheses can be developed:

Hypothesis 2a: Divisions related to the core business receive a tighter operating
control fro m the corporate office than do divisions not related to the core business.

Hypothesis 2b: Divisions not related to the core business receive a tighter financial
control fro m the corporate office than do divisions related to the core business.

Core-business Relatedness and Division Risk-taking Strategy
Relatedness to the core business seems to have implications for formulating risk-
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taking strategies at the division. Some features o f core-business relatedness prompt
divisions to pursue a high level o f risk taking. First, firm-specific knowledge achieved by
collective learning may help related divisions discover new opportunities for product line
expansion and. as a result, these divisions may become m ore active or risk taking in
developing new products and markets. Recently, organizational learning studies have
provided empirical evidence that risk-taking strategy is prevalent in firms with higher
corporate learning, greater related knowledge, and varied knowledge and activities
(Fichman & Kemerer. 1997). This is because they are in a better position to acquire
knowledge crucial to a risk-taking strategy.
It is expected that divisions related to the core business are more likely to obtain
greater and more diverse knowledge than are divisions not related to the core business.
As discussed earlier, collective learning in multibusiness com panies is likely to occur
around their core business. In the collective learning process, divisions acquire
knowledge cooperatively and independently. The knowledge is then shared and utilized
to define and solve problem s generated in the process o f interacting with and adapting to
external environments (Huber. 1991). Collective learning enables divisions to acquire a
great and varied amount o f knowledge about the core business. In the process o f building
and transferring core competencies, they also may understand the means o f achieving
competitive success in core business areas. Such means w ould suggest successful
adaptation within environment boundaries (Prahalad & Hamel. 1990). It seems that their
learning is not limited to what is changing but includes knowledge about how and why
change is occurring. Thus, collective learning enables divisions to incorporate changing
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environmental realities into their competitive strategies for seizing new opportunities (Lei
et al.. 1996).
Second, divisions related to the core business may perceive a lower level o f risk
when formulating risk-taking strategies than would divisions not related to the core
business. The former will show a higher commitment to risk-taking strategy than the
latter. Studies on risky decision making suggest that a high level o f perceived risk (or
uncertainty) is negatively related to making risky decisions (Sitkin & Weingart. 1995).
Uncertainty discourages managers from acting, but knowledge reduces anxiety associated
with uncertainty. By having greater and more diverse knowledge about their business,
divisional managers will have a better understanding o f their strategic options and their
outcomes. The richer the knowledge about the situation, the greater the accuracy in
estimating the possible outcom es o f one's decisions (Fischoff. 1992).
Accurate information is more likely to be acquired in a continuous learning
process. Collective organizational learning rather than individual learning can help
divisions stimulate and upgrade their memory and learning capabilities (Dodgson. 1993).
A knowledge base with greater and more accurate information about businesses may
reduce the level o f risk perceived by divisional managers because it reduces uncertainty
in framing the problem in the context of risk aversion.

The reduction in perceived risk

may help divisional managers accept certain risky strategic options (Goel. 1995). The
association between knowledge and perceived risk leads to the expectation that divisional
managers who operate in the context o f related businesses with opportunities o f collective
learning are more likely to make risky strategic decisions than would those in non-related
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businesses without the advantage o f collective learning.
Third, joint decisions involving divisional managers in related businesses are likely
to make riskier decisions than those in unrelated businesses. Social psychologists provide
a useful insight in comparing joint decision making with individual decision making
(Dion. Baron. & Miller. 1970). According to them, for several reasons groups tend to
make riskier decisions than do individuals. First, joint or group decision making, in
contrast to individual decision making, diffuses responsibility among the group members
(e.g.. Pruitt & Teger, 1969). Diffusion o f responsibility reduces fear o f failure and
thereby enables people to make riskier decisions. Second, groups have a tendency to
evaluate risk-takers more positively than non-risk takers (e.g.. Levinger & Schneider.
1969). Finally, groups tend to stimulate individuals to accept risky decisions.
Individuals have a tendency to do riskier things in groups than they would do
individually.
Divisions related to the core business seem to have more opportunities to
undertake joint activities than do divisions not related to the core business.

Core

business related divisions are more likely to make cooperative efforts in performing
organizational functions, including manufacturing, research and development, marketing,
and other activities. Joint efforts are the means by which divisions achieve synergistic
economic benefits. Operating synergy is achieved when divisional resources, facilities,
and skills are shared am ong related divisions for superior performance (Goold & Luchs.
1993). In the process o f sharing resources, divisional managers become more
comfortable with each other, increasing opportunities for making riskier decisions.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

40

Based on these observations, the following hypothesis is formulated.

Hypothesis 3: Divisions related to the core business show a higher commitment to
risk-taking strategies than do divisions not related to the core business.

Core-business Relatedness as a Moderator
Core-business relatedness moderates the relationship between division risk-taking
strategies and performance. The effects o f risk-taking strategies on performance are
mixed. Most researchers on risk-taking strategy suggest that risk taking has a positive
influence on a firm 's performance (e.g.. Griliches. 1986; Hill & Snell. 1989; Kanter.
1983; Soni. Lilien & Wilson. 1993). However, it is possible that the relationship may
not be as positive as risk-taking strategists expect. A risk-taking strategy such as
innovation is a high risk-high return venture by its very nature. High risk ventures
present opportunities for both high returns and high failure rates. Recognizing the nature
o f risk-taking strategies, some studies have focused on the contextual factors that
influence the relationship between risk-taking strategies and performance (e.g..
Calantone. diBenedetto & Bhoovaraghaven. 1994). Core-business relatedness provides
such a contextual factor. It is speculated here that divisions related to a firm 's core
business face a more favorable internal environment in implementing risk-taking
strategies than do those that are not. The rationales are as follows:
First, the knowledge base acquired through a collective learning process
improves the quality o f an organizational environm ent for implementing risk-taking
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strategies. Studies on innovation suggest that a firm 's ability to understand the means o f
achieving competitive success in a business environment and use it for potential strategic
alternatives is as important as the original innovation in ensuring successful results
(Anderson & Tushman. 1990; Porter. 1985). According to these studies, innovations
aimed at extending technology and expanding markets require intimate knowledge o f
current industry conditions as well as emerging industry trends. M iller (1990) indicated
that radical innovations to redefine markets and make path-breaking changes depend on
understanding established markets coupled with a creative vision. Core-business related
divisions perform organizational learning collectively to enhance such knowledge. Corebusiness relatedness helps divisions to gain greater and richer knowledge about the
means of achieving competitive success in which they operate and encourages them to
increase the potential for gains from their risk-taking strategies.
Second, operating and marketing synergies between divisions related to core
business are likely to help them successfully implement risk-taking strategies. Cross
functional and cross-product coordination are mandatory competencies for effective
innovation exploitation (e.g.. Burgelman & Maidique. 1988: Calantone et al„ 1994:
Damanpour & Evan, 1984). Coordination and cooperation not only reduce the risk o f
failure by creating synergy but also defuse a sense o f responsibility among participants.
Inter-divisional coordination can enhance the efficiency o f risk-taking strategies by
reducing fixed costs and duplicated investments (Kim. 1995). Sharing resources and
job- related knowledge can also reduce the need for acquiring new resources and/or
knowledge and thus yield a positive learning curve. Reviewing eighteen key product
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innovation studies. Barclay and Benson (1990) identified coordination activities as one o f
the most important attributes in new product success. In sum. divisions related to the core
business are likely to exploit operating synergies on the basis o f their relatedness in core
competencies. Operational synergies stemming from core-business relatedness would be
a major critical factor for improving the internal environm ent for successful
implementation o f risk-taking strategies. These discussions lead to the following
hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: The relationship between division risk-taking strategy and division
performance is m oderated by the division s relatedness to the firm s core business

Corporate Control and Division Risk-taking Strategy
The theoretical linkage for studying the relationship between corporate control
and division risk-taking strategies is explained by agency theory. The relationship
between corporate managers and divisional m anagers constitutes an agency relationship
because the former delegates work and responsibilities to the latter (Eisenhardt. 1989;
Fama. 1980; Fama & Jensen. 1983). Because the personal goals o f divisional managers
(agents) differ from those o f corporate managers (principals), the former may not act to
serve the interest o f the latter, causing an agency problem. The goal incongruency
between corporate and divisional managers affects their attitudes toward risk. Because
employment risk is associated with poor performance, divisional managers would
minimize their risk when making decisions on behalf o f corporate managers. Divisional
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managers may be more risk averse than corporate managers because they cannot diversify
their employment risk, whereas corporate managers are better able to diversify their
employment risk by diversifying their business portfolio (Hoskisson & Hitt. 1988).
These differences in attitude toward risk create problems in sharing risk. Principals and
agents who work on the same project may take different actions due to their differences in
risk preferences (Eisenhardt. 1989).
Because o f the differences in risk-taking preferences, the type o f corporate control
can influence the nature o f the agency relationship between corporate and divisional
managers and risk-taking strategies at the divisional level. Before we study the effects o f
corporate control (full, centralized, and laissez-faire) on a division's risk-taking strategy,
let us first look at the agency relationship and risk-sharing problems in conjunction with
two attributes o f corporate control types: decentralization o f decisions and operation o f
the control system.
Divisions subject to a decentralized control system are autonomous and directly
accountable for the performance o f the operations under their charge. Intervention by the
corporate office occurs primarily when a division's performance is below the corporate
managers' expectations. Divisional managers generate decision initiatives, choose one or
a few o f them as their strategic options, and execute the decisions independent o f other
divisions (Arrow. 1971). By contrast, with a centralized control system, corporate
managers still hold the authority o f decision making. Divisional managers may generate
decision alternatives but execute the decision only if ratified by corporate managers. In
the ratification process, divisional managers’ preferences implied in their strategic plans
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are checked and evaluated by corporate managers. Corporate managers with a
centralized decision-making system are more likely to collect information about the
behavior o f their divisional managers than are corporate managers with a decentralized
decision-making system. Divisional managers* behavior under centralized control is
likely to be monitored and evaluated more vigilantly by corporate managers than
divisional managers under a decentralized control system. Consequently, divisional
managers under centralized operating control are exposed to a low level o f agency
problems than are divisional managers under decentralized operating control.
According to agency theory, a principal can control an agent on the basis o f the
agent's outcome or the agent's behavior. Outcome-based controls may motivate an
agent's behavior by forcing him to align his or her preferences with those o f the principal.
But the alignment is only possible at the cost o f transferring risk to the agent (Eisenhardt.
1989). It is because an agent's outcome results not only from his or her behavior but
also from economic climates, change o f consum er's needs, com petitor's actions, and so
on. Interaction between behavior and those context factors make outcomes uncertain.
The risk resulting from outcome uncertainty must be bome by either a principal or an
agent.
In outcome-based control, a principal provides an agent with some decision
making authority and. as the cost o f that delegation, the agent is asked to bear some risk
from outcome uncertainty. In the same context, divisional managers, given
accountability for profits and losses, have to bear the risk of their strategic decisions. To
divisional managers, proposing uncertain (risky) projects is equal in effect to risking their
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future employment because outcom e-based control does not consider the amount o f risk
in evaluating performance (H oskisson & Hitt. 1988: Hoskisson et al.. 1993). Thus,
under outcome-based controls, divisional managers avoid risk and favor decisions with
predictable returns. Studies indicate that divisional controls using financial performance
measures encourage short-term horizons and risk avoidance among divisional managers
(Hayes & Abernathy. 1980: Hirst. 1983; Loeshcer. 1984: Norbum & M iller. 1981:
Rappaport. 1978: Stonich. 1981). In contrast, behavior-based controls may motivate
agents by monitoring their preferences in terms o f first-hand know ledge and behavioral
information. When the principal knows what the agent has done, the principal does not
have to rely on outcome-based controls. Under these circumstances, divisional managers
believe that the amount o f risk can be recognized in performance evaluation and that
their perceived risk level may be reduced when they propose their strategic plans.
Understanding how divisional managers react to the degree o f centralization in
decision making and the basis o f control systems (outcome vs. behavior) helps us to
speculate how they will react to different corporate control types—centralized. full, and
laissez-faire. As noted earlier, centralized corporate control is the configuration in which
operating decisions are centralized. In addition, financial and strategic controls are used
only moderately because centralized operating control is confused by divisions with
financial and strategic controls presupposing the decentralization o f div isio n 's operation.
Under this type of corporate control, strategic decisions o f divisional m anagers are more
closely aligned with the preferences o f corporate managers. This is because divisional
managers are monitored and evaluated with behavioral information collected by corporate
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managers and the risk o f their decisions is more likely to be considered in the evaluation
o f their divisional performance. Consequently, it is expected that divisional managers
under centralized corporate control take greater risks. As a result, their divisions show a
high level o f commitment to risk-taking strategies.
In contrast, full corporate control is a configuration in which divisions are
decentralized with respect to operating decisions and the corporate office makes extensive
use o f financial and strategic controls. As noted earlier, this type o f corporate control is
usually associated with unrelated diversification or 'com petitive M -form .' Because the
corporate office lacks operating knowledge o f divisions not related to its core business,
divisional managers are given autonomy in strategic decision making and are evaluated
on the basis o f financial performance. Under this type o f corporate control, divisional
managers are likely to take strategic actions which may differ from corporate managers'
preferences. Therefore, it can be expected that divisional managers subject to full
corporate control avoid risk and favor strategic decisions with predictable returns. Thus,
these divisions show a low level o f commitment to risk-taking strategies.
Divisional managers under laissez-faire corporate control enjoy a higher level o f
discretion than do their counterparts under centralized and full controls. The laissez-faire
control type is usually found in H-form firms or holding companies where the structure is
loosely divisionalized and controls between the corporate office and divisions are limited.
W hen control is exercised, it is more likely to be outcome-based than behavior-based.
Compared with divisions under the two other types o f corporate control mentioned above,
divisional managers under laissez-faire corporate control are more likely to take strategic
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actions which differ from corporate managers' preferences. This is because these
managers are not under tight financial controls although they enjoy a high level of
autonomy in operation decision making. These managers are not as responsible for the
results o f their strategies decisions as their counterparts under full corporate control are.
Furthermore, divisional managers are more likely to take advantage o f the absence o f
tight corporate controls to benefit their own interests. Consequently, they are likely to
avoid projects with a high level o f risk and likely to pursue conservative strategic actions
only enough to maintain income stability. Their decisions will be directed toward
maintaining the current competitive position and avoiding potentially profitable but risky
challenges. Those managers are more likely to passively react to environment changes
than to aggressively attack opportunities. On the basis o f these discussions, the following
hypotheses are advanced:

Hypothesis 5a: Divisions under centralized corporate controls show a higher
commitment to risk-taking strategies than do their counterparts under fu ll
corporate controls or laissez-faire corporate controls.

Hypothesis 5b: Divisions under fu ll corporate controls show a higher commitment
to risk-taking strategies than do their counterparts under laissez-faire corporate
controls.

Hypothesis 5c: Dependence on financial controls fro m the corporate office is
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negatively related to a division s commitment to risk-taking strategies.

Hypothesis 5d: Centralization in operating controls fro m the corporate office is
positively related to a division s commitment to risk-taking strategies.

Corporate Control as a Moderator
A strategic fit perspective provides a useful framework for explaining the effects
of corporate control on the relationship between risk-taking strategies and performance.
Research on strategy implementation suggests that an organization has a variety o f
structural forms (including control systems) and organizational processes to choose from
when implementing a chosen strategy, but ail structural forms are not equally effective in
implementing a given strategy (Galbraith & Kazanjian. 1986). To be effective, divisionlevel strategy must be implemented consistent with control systems o f the corporate
office (Hill & Hoskisson. 1987: Govindarajan & Fisher. 1990). In this context, a
particular relationship between the corporate office and its division is required for the
successful implementation o f division risk-taking strategies.
Studies suggest that some control systems are more effective in implementing
risk-taking strategies than other control systems (Gupta. 1987: Morris & Trotter. 1990).
As noted earlier, control systems can be regarded as a process o f monitoring either
behavior or outcome (Ouchi, 1977). These are referred to as behavior controls and
outcome controls, respectively. Performance assessm ent according to objective outcome
criteria has the merit o f precision and a detailed a priori specification. However, an
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outcome control system which depends on objective output criteria fails to quantify
performance dim ensions o f risk-taking strategies such as research and developm ent and
marketing efforts (Govindarajan. 1988). Researchers have also found that one major
organizational constraint on managerial risk-taking is an oppressive outcom e control
system which does not contem plate subjective inform ation for perform ance assessment
(Morris & Trotter. 1990). Risk-taking strategies with a high level o f outcom e uncertainty
and a long-term horizon are difficult to quantify with objective perform ance dimensions.
Given the high uncertainty, divisional managers are likely to be m otivated to react in
dysfunctional ways when forced to meet oppressive, short-term outcom e goals.
A corporate office's overemphasis on outcome-based controls may discourage
divisional managers from undertaking creative and innovative risk-taking strategies in
favor o f short-term and tangible performance outcomes. Creative and innovative risktaking strategies tend to be intangible and often unrecognized in the outcome-based
control process. Com m itm ent to implement risk-taking strategies often requires up-front
investments that cannot be recouped to enhance the short-run objective goals. Gupta
(1987) found that adopting a long-term and riskier strategy at the expense o f short-term
cash flow can only be recognized with a subjective evaluation o f divisional managers by
the corporate office. This subjective information is gathered by observing and
monitoring the behavior o f the agent. High subjectivity in performance assessment
almost always occurs simultaneously with high corporate involvement in and
understanding o f ongoing events, decisions, and actions o f a division. Therefore, it can
be suggested that an outcome-based control system is less likely to m ake a positive
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contribution to the performance o f divisions with risky strategies than would a behaviorbased control system with subjective information.
Studies of strategy implementation assert that uncertainties stem ming from risktaking strategies can be reduced through the mutual coordination o f decisions between
corporate and divisional managers (Gupta. 1987: Gupta & Govindarajan. 1986). Risktaking strategies make an organization face conflicts with its external environment.

For

example. R&D projects must be m odified in whole or in part as relevant environmental
forces such as customer needs and technological trends change (Souder & Moenaert.
1992). The greater the degree o f conflict between the organization and its environment,
the greater the uncertainty it confronts (Pfeffer & Salancik. 1978: Thom pson. 1967).
Studies indicate that the greater the uncertainty in the environment, the greater is an
organization's need for information-processing capacity (Duncan. 1973: Galbraith. 1973:
Tushman & Nadler. 1978). Accordingly, for effective implementation, risk-taking
strategies should call for greater organizational information-processing capacity. A
division's capacity for information-processing can be enhanced through mutual
coordination between the corporate office and the division because such coordination
allows for a spontaneous and open exchange o f information and ideas.
Coordination between the corporate office and the division can be achieved by
formal or informal systems. A corporation's formal system o f strategic planning
involving divisions is a good example o f the mutual coordination between the corporate
office and its division. But the primary' utility o f formal planning systems lies in a
strategic review at pre-specified intervals, not in ongoing adjustments during the course
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o f the year (Lorange & Vancil. 1978). Unexpected environmental events and conflicts
generate the need for ongoing adjustments and information processing. Therefore,
mutual coordination necessary for effective implementation o f risk-taking strategies can
be achieved primarily by openness and informality in the relationship between a
corporate office and its divisions, not by a formal strategic planning system (Gupta.
1987). This open and informal relationship between the corporate office and the division
can help corporate executives become more knowledgeable about a division. This is
likely to be particularly beneficial for divisions implementing risk-taking strategies.
Some studies have focused their attention on the impact o f inter-divisional
coordination and cooperation on implementing divisional strategies (Kim. 1995).
According to them, uncertainties resulting from risk-taking strategies can be reduced by
inter-division coordination o f risk-taking strategic activities and the acquisition of
required information. For instance, one division with a risk-taking strategy such as
technological innovation or new market penetration can reduce the impact o f uncertainty
from technology or market through coordination with other divisions with a similar risktaking strategy. Divisions can implement their risk-taking strategies in cooperation with
each other under the control o f their corporate office. Knowledge, skills, and resources
can be shared through inter-division coordination such as the inter-divisional exchange
o f personnel and various meetings. Complementary investments can be made among the
divisions o f a corporation (Hoskisson et al.. 1993). Therefore, divisions under
organizational processes which are able to facilitate inter-division coordination of risktaking strategies are more likely to reduce uncertainties they face. In this way. they can
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implement their strategies more effectively than divisions without the organizational
process.
Following a strategic fit perspective, this study proposes that divisions that enjoy
a cooperative relationship with their corporate office as well as enjoy inter-divisional
cooperation are more likely to achieve better performance from implementing risk-taking
strategies. It seems that they would outperform the divisions under the corporate-division
relationship in which mutual coordination and inter-divisional coordination activities are
relatively less feasible and financial targets are highly emphasized. A particular corporate
control type may generate the corporate-division relationship which supports these
activities more easily than others. Based on discussions thus far. we can speculate the
following set o f organizational contingencies that explain the relationship between
corporate control, risk-taking strategy, and performance.
First, subjective performance evaluation o f divisional managers is more likely to
occur under a centralized corporate control system than under a decentralized corporate
control system. When corporate managers work closely with divisional managers, they
should be able to observe the behavior and thoughts o f divisional managers, which make
subjective performance evaluation possible (Gupta. 1987). Centralized corporate control
helps corporate managers become more knowledgeable about the division, its products,
and decision processes. Centralization rather than decentralization can help both
corporate and divisional managers to develop open and informal communication channels
for information exchange.

Heavy involvement in divisional operations by the corporate

office provides corporate officers with the opportunity to understand the difficulties that
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divisional managers face in implementing their strategies and to obtain behavior-based
information for perform ance assessment.
Second, coordination between divisions is more likely to occur in a centralized
corporate control system than in one with a highly decentralized control. In a centralized
operation, corporate managers are knowledgeable about divisional operations and thus
should be able to assist their divisions when such needs arise. Divisions that are
relatively independent and deal with each other on a formal basis would need more time
for corporate as well as divisional managers in order to understand the situations which
inter-divisional cooperations are needed. Arms-length relations between a corporate
office and its divisions hinder the development o f open and informal working relations.
Some degree o f centralized control over strategic and operating decisions o f
interdependent divisions is required for successfully implementing risk-taking strategies.
For instance. Child (1984) indicated that some centralization is necessary to achieve
inter-divisional coordination. Berg (1973) and Pitts (1977) found that the interdivisional
sharing o f technological resources can be achieved through the centralization o f research
activities. Mintzberg (1983) also argued that centralized control over the functions
common to the divisions facilitates coordination between them. It is suggested here that
divisions under centralized corporate controls are more likely to be able to plan and
perform coordinated activities than their counterparts under full or laissez-faire controls.
Lastly, divisions under full corporate controls are likely to be effective in linking
risky projects to goal attainment because their tight financial and strategic controls force
divisions to develop marketable products in order to achieve their financial objectives.
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Divisions under laissez-faire controls are less likely to implement risk-taking strategies as
effectively as divisions under centralized and/or full controls. Because they enjoy a high
level o f autonomy in a relatively loose corporate control system, they do not face pressure
from the corporate office to reach certain financial objectives. Furthermore, the higher
level o f decentralization makes corporate managers develop an open and informal
relationship with divisional managers by which they can exert some influence. The
above discussions lead to the development o f the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 6a: The relationship between division risk-taking strategy and division
performance is m oderated by corporate control type (i.e.. full, centralized, or
laissez-faire).

Hypothesis 6b: The relationship between division risk-taking strategy and division
performance is m oderated by dependence on financial control: the interaction
between dependence on financial control and division risk-taking strategy' is
negatively related to division performance.

Hypothesis 6c: The relationship between division risk-taking strategy and division
performance is m oderated by centralization o f operating control: the interaction
between centralization o f operating control and division risk-taking strategy is
positively related to division performance.
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CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHODS

This chapter explains the research methods used to test the research hypotheses
developed in Chapter II. The first section discusses the sample and data used in this
research. The second section describes the measures used and their operationalization.
The last section focuses on the statistical analyses used in the study.

Sample and Data
The sample for this study was drawn from a list o f Korean business groups which
was compiled and published by the Bank o f Korea in 1997. The list includes 63 large
Korean business groups. To develop the sampling plan o f this study, the unit o f analysis
must be considered in the proposed relationships o f the research model. Since research
hypotheses were developed to test at the divisional level, the unit o f analysis is the
division within a business group. In the Korean case, this unit o f analysis corresponds to
affiliated companies o f the business group.
Manufacturing firms which are affiliated with business groups were subjected to
empirical study. To be included, a manufacturing firm had to be traded on the Korea
Stock Exchange or registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and its
number o f employees in 1995 had to exceed one hundred and fifty. These criteria
characterized the main divisions o f Korean business groups. Using these criteria, the
companies to be surveyed were drawn from A List o f 63 Largest Korean Business Groups
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and Their Subsidiaries complied and published by the Bank o f Korea. The subject
companies are com posed o f 192 manufacturing companies affiliated with 50 business
groups. Appendix A shows the business groups included in the survey.
The data regarding corporate control and R&D investment was collected by
questionnaire survey. The questionnaire was developed from two questionnaires used in
previous studies: H ill's (1988) and Markides and W illiam son's (1996). Those previous
questionnaires were developed for collecting relevant data from multidivisional firms.
They were used to study U.S. and U.K. multibusiness companies. Although the
subsidiaries o f Korean business groups are legally independent, they are closely affiliated
with the business group and act as if they are part o f a multidivisional company.
Modifications to the questionnaire were required for this study because the study deals
with legally independent, but affiliated, companies and their relationships with the group
planning office o f the business group.
The final version o f the survey questionnaire was the result o f three stages o f
development. At the first stage, two researchers who are familiar with the managem ent
practices o f Korean business groups assisted in modifying the questionnaire to match
Korean circumstances. A revised version with some modifications, at the second stage,
was developed into a pilot test version o f the survey questionnaire by incorporating
professional advice and comments from two experts in studying Korean business groups.
At the last stage, com m ents from three first-line managers o f Korean companies were
collected and incorporate into the final version o f the survey questionnaire.

The basic

framework o f the questionnaires used in previous studies was maintained. However.
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words, expressions and situations in the questions were examined and m odified to ensure
matching the situation statements used for U.S. and U.K. firms with the situations
between groups and member com panies o f Korean business groups. The questionnaire
used in the study is shown in A ppendix B.
The final questionnaire was mailed to the Chief Planning Officers o f the selected
affiliated companies o f Korean business groups, all o f whom are knowledgeable about
overall business group operations and the relationship between group and member
companies.

In total. 57 firms from 32 business groups responded to the survey, for a

response rate of 29.69 percent. This return rate is comparable with the rates reported by
prior studies employing questionnaire surveys with top managers as m ajor subjects1.
Considering the chaotic situation2 facing Korean companies during the survey period, the
response rate was acceptable. All respondents worked at the planning office o f affiliated
com panies and their average tenure at the companies was 10.18 years. Industry
membership o f the sample firms is presented in Table 3-1.

The results of reviewing articles published in Strategic Management Journal from 1980 through
1995 showed that 45 studies employed a questionnaire survey research method and 38 of them
had top managers, including CEOs and executives, as the subject of questionnaire survey. The
response rates of these survey studies range between 11 percent and 87 percent. The average rate
is 34.72 percent.
During the time period of the survey, the Korean government faced a foreign exchange crisis
and applied for bailout funds from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on December 4. 1997.
Korean firms were asked by the IMF to perform corporate restructuring and enhance
management transparency. Due to this crisis. Korean firms began to work their way through
financial hardships resulting from a high interest rate and a high exchange rate.
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TABLE 3-1
Industry Membership of Respondents’ Firms

Industry

Frequency

Food Products and Beverages
Textiles
Leather. Luggage and Footwear
Pulp. Paper and Paper Products
Coke. Refined Petroleum Products and Nuclear Fuel
Chemicals and Chemical Products
Other Nonmetallic Mineral Products
Basic Metals
Machinery and Equipment
Office. Accounting and Computing Machinery
Electrical Machinery and Apparatus
Radio. Television and Communication Equipment
M otor Vehicles
Other Transport Equipment

Total

j
6
1
1
->
9
5
6
4
■>
1
12
-»

j
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Potential nonrespondent biases were checked by comparing respondents' firms
and nonrespondents' firms with respect to their size (measured by their assets and
employees) and their profitability (measured by return on assets and sales growth) for
1994-1995. First, the size o f respondents' firms was compared to that o f nonrespondents'
firms in terms o f their assets and number o f employees for 1994-1995. The results o f the
nonparametric test indicated that nonrespondents's firms did not differ significantly (at
the p < 0.05 level in the Mann-Whitney test) from the respondents with respect to number
o f employees. However. a significant difference (p = 0.032) was found for their total
assets. It is speculated that relatively bigger companies (in terms o f assets) were more

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

59

likely to respond to the survey because most surv ey research focused on large firms rather
than on small firms so that they, relatively large firms, seem more exposed to this kind o f
survey research (experience effect). As a follow-up analysis, the total assets for
responding com panies were compared to the average total assets o f the population.
Although the mean total assets were higher for the sample, the difference was not
statistically significant. Second, the profitability o f respondents' firms was compared to
that o f nonrespondents with respect to return on assets (ROA) and sales growth for 19941995. No significant difference was found between the two sets o f companies on these
criteria at the p = 0.05 level (/-value o f -0.94 for ROA and /-value o f -0.76 for sales
growth). Overall, results support the representativeness o f the sample.
Data regarding the degree o f internationalization was collected from secondary
sources including Annual Corporation Reports (Hoisa Yonkam in Korean) for 1993-1995.
published in 1996 by Maeil Business Newspaper Co.. Ltd. o f Korea. The Investment
Guide to Korean Companies, published by Samsung Securities Co. Ltd.. and The Korea
Company Handbook, published by Ssangyong Investment & Securities Co. Ltd.
Industry-level data regarding performance. R&D investment, and internationalization
were collected from publications including The Korea Statistical Yearbook for 19931995. published by the National Statistical Office in the Republic o f Korea, and Financial
Statement Analysis for 1993-1995. published by the Bank o f Korea. Lastly, firm
performance measures were collected from secondary sources including Annual
Corporation Reports for 1992-1995. published by Maeil Business Newspaper Co.. Ltd.
o f Korea, and the KIS FAS database, made by Korean Investors Services. Inc.
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Measurements
Core-business Relatedness
Core-business relatedness was measured by dummy variable coding for each
division's relatedness to the core business o f the business group: divisions related to the
core business vs. divisions not related to the core business. The approach taken for
measurement: (1) identified individual businesses o f the business group to which a
division belongs: (2) identified the core business o f the relevant business group: and (3)
evaluated whether each division was related or not related to the core business. First,
individual businesses were identified by product difference. That is. each product or
product type was considered to be a separate business. The system for product
classification was drawn from Korean Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). In
strategy research, the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system has been widely
used as a basis for identifying individual businesses and measuring interrelations among
businesses (e.g.. M ontgomery & W emerfelt. 1988: Palepu. 1985).

Individual businesses

o f the business group were identified according to four-digit Korean SIC industries.
Second, to operationalize the concept o f core business, two m ajor dimensions
were used: the relative contribution o f each individual business to the group's total sales
and the age o f each business in the group. As discussed in the last chapter, the concept o f
core business involves the relative significance o f each business to the corporation and
the expertise generated in each business. The sales contribution o f each individual
business unit or division to the corporation has been widely accepted by academics and
practitioners as a major indicator showing the relative significance o f each unit or
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division. This indicator has been used in portfolio analysis techniques such as the BCG
matrix to develop corporate strategies for multibusiness corporations (Wheelen <£:
Hunger. 1995).
This study considered the age o f each business in the group as an indicator of the
degree of knowledge about its business operation and com petitive environments and the
degree o f collective learning between the corporate office and divisions related the
individual business. Prior studies on organizational learning suggest that there is a
relationship between a corporation's age and organizational learning. For example. Child
and Keiser (1981) argue that organizations learn from experience either by strategic
choice or by aging. Starbuck (1965) found that organizations learn more and more about
coping with their environment, external and internal, as they grow older. March and his
colleagues (1991) argue that what is learned from any particular kind o f experience varies
substantially across time. Economists also suggest that organizational learning is the
outcome o f cumulative experience across time (Dodgson. 1993).
To identify the core business(es) o f relevant business groups, first, the relative
significance to the corporation o f each individual business was evaluated. The expected
sales contribution was used as the cutoff point to judge w hether each individual business
is a relatively significant business or not in its group. The expected sales contribution
was obtained by dividing the total sales o f the business group by the number o f individual
businesses. The basic logic o f the identification is that the difference in sales
contributions between individual businesses represents their relative significance to the
group. If every business is equally significant, it will show an equal contribution to the
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total sales o f its business group. As a second step, ages o f divisions in relatively
important business!es) were considered in judging whether each relatively important
business is a core business or not. Finally, to enhance the validity o f identification, tw-o
books about Korean business groups were referred to before final judgements: A Study o f
Korean Chaebols (Cho. 1994) and Chaebols (Seoul Economy. 1995). As a result o f the
identification process, relevant business groups were found to have, on average. 1. 69
core businesses (the range being 1 to 3).
Third, the Korean SIC system was again used to evaluate whether each
responding division is related to the identified core business(es) o f its business group.
The two-digit Korean SIC level classification was used to define the same industry group.
Divisions in the same industry group o f the core business were considered to be related to
the core business. In diversification strategy research, the SIC system-based approach to
‘relatedness', such as the concentric index (M ontgomery & Hariharan. 1991). and the
entropy index (Palepu. 1985). has used the definition o f industry group and segment
according to the two-digit SIC level o f classification.
As a result o f the identification o f core business relatedness, twenty-seven
divisions were classified as being not related to the core business and thirty divisions
were identified as divisions related to the core business. Relevant data were collected
from Annual Corporation Reports for 1992-1995. published by the Maeil Business
Newspaper Co.. Ltd. o f Korea.
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Corporate Control
Corporate control was measured using configurations consisting o f three basic
dimensions o f corporate control: operating, financial and strategic. From the
questionnaire responses, a multi-item scale was constructed for each dim ension o f
corporate control. These scales are as follows:
Operating. This scale measured the degree to which operating decisions are
centralized within the group. It was constructed from the mean response to twenty-three
questions. Respondents were asked to indicate on a four-point Likert scale the extent to
which the corporate office has decision-m aking authority for operating decisions. A high
score on O perating meant that the authority for operating decisions was centralized at the
group planning office.
Financial. This scale measured the degree to which abstract profit criteria are used
by the group planning office to evaluate m em ber companies' performance. It was
constructed from the mean response to eleven questions. Respondents were asked to
indicate on a five-point Likert scale the importance attached by the corporate office to the
abstract criteria when assessing subsidiaries' performance. A low score on Financial
indicated that abstract criteria were important.
Strategic. This scale measured the degree to which the corporate office exercised
strategic control over member companies. It was constructed from the m ean response to
thirteen questions. Respondents indicated on a five-point Likert scale the degree to which
the group planning office considered strategic factors when setting objectives o f member
companies. A low score indicated a high degree o f strategic control over member
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companies.
Table 3-2 shows the mean, standard deviation, and C ronbach's alpha score for
each scale. All C ronbach's alpha reliability coefficients for the three scale variables were
greater than 0.70. The coefficients o f this study are comparable with those o f the prior
studies: 0.927 for operating. 0.726 for financial, and 0.886 for strategic in H ill's (1988)
study: and 0.87 for operating. 0.72 for financial, and 0.75 for strategic in Markides and
W illiam son’s (1996) study. All three scales used in the study were regarded as
satisfactory for established scales.

TABLE 3-2
Summary of Scales

Scale

Means

S.D.

Alpha

Items

Operating

1.882

0.469

0.9062

23

Financial

2.407

0.638

0.8437

11

Strategic

3.611

0.546

0.8517

13

Cluster analysis was used to identify corporate control types from three main
control dimensions. Outliers were detected before starting the partitioning process
because cluster analysis is very sensitive to outliers. One case was deleted because it
showed a profile quite different from the other cases. Thus, fifty-six cases were included
in the partitioning process. The variables were measured on a standardization scale. This
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is because when variables are measured on different scales, variables that are measured in
larger numbers will contribute more to the computed distance than variables that are
recorded in small numbers.
This study conducted a hierarchical clustering and then refined the solution using
a nonhierarchical clustering technique. Performing two methods complementarily can
circumvent the problems or disadvantages o f two methods (Aldenderfer & Blashfield.
1984; Sharma. 1996). Hierarchical methods have the disadvantage that once an
observation is assigned to a cluster it cannot be reassigned to another cluster. On the
other hand, nonhierarchical clustering algorithms perform poorly and. in turn, have
suboptimal solutions when random initial partitions are used. The procedure used for a
hierarchical clustering includes the Euclidean distance for calculating distances and
similarities between the values for the items and the complete-linkage to combine
clusters. The cluster centers resulting from the hierarchical clustering method were used
as an initial partition in the following procedure, a nonhierarchical clustering method.
The K-mean cluster algorithm was used to classify firms according to their corporate
control dimensions.
The results o f clustering are reported in Table 3-3. Three types o f corporate
control were identified as expected. The F-tests demonstrate that each o f the control
dimension variables differed significantly across the clusters. The scores in Table 3-3
represent the mean values indicated by firms in a particular cluster for given control
dimension variables. The three clusters can be characterized as showm in Table 3-4.
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Cluster

Operating

1

2.2873

2.3794

3.2074

1J

TABLE 3-3
Corporate Control Type Resulting from Cluster Analysis

1.7396

1.6860

3.9790

11

j

1.4832

2.8017

3.9056

Overall Means

1.8630

2.4091

3.6332

F

51.2410**

Financial

17.3101**

Strategic

N umber o f Cases

22.5962**

+ /?< 0.10: * p < 0.05: * * p < 0.01

TABLE 3-4
Characteristics of Clusters

Clusters

Characteristics

Cluster 1

Divisions with relatively strong centralized control over operating
decisions. They also had a moderate emphasis on market and strategic
control by the corporate office.

Cluster 2

Divisions with relatively decentralized control over operating decisions.
They had a strong emphasis on market control but relatively weak control
over strategic decisions by the corporate office.

Cluster 3

Divisions with relatively decentralized control over operating decisions.
They had a weak emphasis on market and strategic controls.
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Specifically, clusters seem to show the three corporate control types observed in
prior studies. Cluster I divisions showed control characteristics consistent with
centralized corporate control: relatively strong centralization o f operating decisions and a
moderate emphasis on market and strategic controls. Cluster 3 divisions showed the
control structure characterizing laissez-faire corporate control: relatively strong
decentralization o f operating decisions and a weak emphasis on market and strategic
controls. Cluster 2 divisions are decentralized with respect to operating functions and are
characterized by relatively high utilization o f financial control, but they show a lower
level o f utilization o f strategic control than other clusters. Strategic control is a process
whereby the corporate office determ ines the context within which autonomous divisions
must formulate their competitive strategy. It has been argued that without strategic
control the firm will have no overall sense o f strategic direction (Chandler, 1962).
However, this characteristic may be observed partly because the Korean business group
has a different structure. M em ber companies o f Korean business groups, while legally
independent companies, may have somewhat unique patterns o f a particular control
structure, full corporate control.

It is observed that most member companies o f Korean

business groups perform the function o f strategic planning at the member company level
simultaneously with planning at the group level.
The characteristics o f Cluster 2 can be explained from another theoretical
viewpoint. It has been observed in studies on the role o f corporate offices in the
diversified corporation that the corporate office placing strong pressure on business-unit
managers for profitability tends to limit the involvement o f headquarters in business
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strategy formulation (e.g.. Goold & Cam pbell. 1987). In other words, divisional
managers or business-unit managers have not only the authority, but also the
responsibility o f strategy making. Em phasizing only financial targets without giving
discretion for strategy formulation may be frustrating for member companies. It is
because responsibility to achieve the objective targets outweighs the authority o f strategic
choice o f weapon to use for the achievement o f financial goals. This perspective is
consistent with the present study's finding. The findings point out that this issue needs
more investigation and further empirical studies with other samples. This characteristic
o f Cluster 2 must also be considered when the findings are interpreted and discussed.

In

spite o f a difference in emphasis on strategic control by Cluster 2 divisions, the general
patterns from operating and financial control dim ensions matched with those presented in
the prior studies. Therefore, this group o f affiliated companies was considered to be the
divisions under full corporate control.

Centralization of Operating Controls
Centralization o f operating controls w as measured using the Operating scale. A
high score indicated more centralization.

Dependence on Financial Controls
Dependence on financial controls was measured using the Financial scale. A low
score indicated greater dependence on financial controls.
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Division Risk-taking Strategy
In this study, division risk-taking strategy was operationalized with two kinds o f
division-level strategies: (1) R&D investment and (2) internationalization.
R&D Investment. R&D expenditure or investment has been used as an indicator
o f firm risk taking in previous studies (e.g.. Baysinger & Hoskisson. 1989: Hoskisson et
al.. 1993). Technological capabilities have been recognized as a central source o f the
strategic competitiveness o f firms and countries (Helfet. 1994: Porter. 1990). However.
R&D entails a high level of risk in that R&D projects by nature have high failure rates
(Mansfield. 1968).
In divisions, the decline in immediate performance due to R&D project failure can
be detrimental to managerial career prospects and thus, divisional managers have
incentives to make a less than optimal level o f R&D investment. By contrast, corporate
managers may be more concerned with the potential benefits o f R&D than with the
associated risk because they can reduce their employment risk through corporate portfolio
diversification (Amihud & Lev. 1981; Hoskisson & Hitt. 1988). Thus. R&D investment
can be viewed as a strategic behavior affected by agency conflicts. Also, like other risky
decisions. R&D projects cause organizations to face uncertain outcomes and an uncertain
task environment. The four major sources o f these uncertainties are custom ers' needs,
technological trends, competitors' strategies, and organizational resources (Souder &
Moenaert. 1992). R&D projects must be modified in whole or in part as relevant events
unfold over time and new information is generated.
R&D investment was measured by research and development expenditures as a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

70

proportion o f total sales. In some studies, this measure is called R&D investment
intensity (Hoskisson & Hitt. 1988). This measurement has been widely used in the
literature (e.g.. Bavsinger & Hoskisson. 1989). It has been found to be positively related
to measures o f innovative output such as patents (Hitt. Hoskisson. Ireland. & Harrison.
1991) and new product introductions (Kamien & Schwartz. 1982). Using R&D
investment as a proportion o f total sales, rather than the absolute amount o f research and
development expenditure, deflates for size and controls for heteroscedasticity (Hambrick.
MacMillan. & Barbosa. 1983). This measure permits relative comparison among firms.
In order to control for industry’ effects, firm-level R&D investment intensity was
divided by industry’ R&D investment intensity (Dess. Ireland. & Hitt. 1990: Hoskisson &
Hitt. 1988). It has been argued that industries differ with respect to the degree to which
the field's market demands or accepts product innovations (Hambrick & MacMillan.
1985). Industries also differ with respect to the extent o f their basic knowledge in the
field in which they operate. The greater this knowledge, the more efficient will be the
conversion o f R&D inputs into outputs (Bavsinger & Hoskisson. 1989). Thus, the
measure o f R&D investment used in this study was obtained from the following formula:

Firm R&D expenditure/Firm sales
Industry R&D expenditure/industry sales

This measure indicates the relative intensity rather than the absolute intensity o f a firm 's
R&D investment. It involves the firm's R&D investment which is controlled for size
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effect as well as for industry effect. This measure was averaged over the period 19931995. Firm-level data including R&D expenditures, and sales were obtained from the
questionnaire and the Annual Corporation Reports for 1992-1995. published by Maeil
Business Newspaper Co.. Ltd. o f Korea. Korean industry-level data was obtained from
Financial Statement Analysis for 1993-1995. complied and published by the Bank o f
Korea.
Internationalization.

Some studies have operationalized internationalization as

firm risk-taking strategic behavior (Brouthers. 1995: Shama. 1995). Internationalization
o f the firm is usually seen as a process in which the enterprise gradually increases its
international involvement and exposes itself to the international environment. This
process evolves in an interplay between the development o f knowledge about foreign
markets and operations, on one hand, and an increasing commitment o f resources to
foreign markets, on the other hand (Johanson & Vahlne. 1990). W hile international
markets provide new opportunities, they also present increased challenges from
international and domestic competitors. Operating firms in international markets with
regional and national differences are quite complex and is not easily accomplished (Hitt
et al.. 1994).
Scholars refer to risk incidental to internationalization (M iller. 1992: Vemon.
1983 ). For instance. Miller (1992) suggests details o f a three-part integration o f
international risk variables: (1) general environmental. (2) industry, and (3) firm-specific
risk. First, general environmental uncertainty arises when the general environment within
a given country is different from that in another country. Included in this factor are such
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variables as political risk, governm ent policy uncertainty, economic uncertainty, social
uncertainty, and natural uncertainty.
Second, industry uncertainty includes the risks associated with differences in
industry/product-specific variables between countries. Among these variables are the
input market uncertainty and product market uncertainty, and com petitive uncertainty.
On an international basis, industry' uncertainties are closely related to general
environmental uncertainties because changes in the environmental variables such as
supply agreements and trade laws directly affect industry uncertainties. These include
input market uncertainties from the availability o f inputs and com petitive uncertainties
from the entrance o f new competitors.
Finally, firm-specific uncertainty includes operating uncertainty, liability
uncertainty, and behavioral uncertainty accompanied by firms operations in a particular
situation. While these firm-specific uncertainties exist in the domestic market as well as
internationally, the nature o f international operations aggravate these uncertainties
because the firm must perform these functions in different cultures where the
relationships may vary significantly from the home market. Like this, international
operations are by their nature risky and more difficult to be structured and controlled.
Internationalization has been found to be positively related to m anager's risk aversion
(Dichtl, Leibold. Koglmayr. & Muller. 1984).
In this study, the degree o f internationalization was m easured as export sales as a
percentage of total sales. Sullivan and Bauerschmidt (1989) report that the degree of
export activity discriminates the relative internationalization between firms. Most studies
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regarding internationalization have used the export ratio as the estimator o f the degree o f
internationalization (Sullivan. 1994). Using this measure, rather than the absolute
amount of export, the effect o f size can be controlled. Thus, this measure permits relative
comparison among firms. In order to control for industry effects, the firm-level export
ratio was divided by the industry export ratio. The measure o f internationalization used
in this study was obtained by using the following formula:

Firm export sales/Firm sales
Industry export sales/industry sales

This measure indicates the relative intensity rather than the absolute intensity o f a firm 's
internationalization. It involves the firm's internationalization which is controlled for
size effect as well as for industry effect. The ratio was averaged over the period 19931995. Firm-level export sales and total sales were obtained from Annual Corporation
Reports for 1992-1995. published by Maeil Business Newspaper Co.. Ltd. o f Korea.
Industry-level export sales and total sales were obtained from The Korean Statistical
Yearbook, published by the National Statistical Office o f South Korea.

Division Performance
As indicated above, in the Korean business group, division performance in the
relevant hypotheses can be measured in the form o f an independent firm's performance
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because affiliated firms report their performance as legally independent companies.
ROA was employed as the measure o f division performance. ROA is m easured as
Net Income/Total Assets. Bettis (1981) argues that ROA reflects a return directly under
control o f management. ROA is highly correlated with return on sales (ROS) (Keats &
Hitt, 1988). It is also considered a more accurate accounting-based indicator than return
on equity (ROE) for the Korean sample where the debt-equity ratio is high and capital
markets are imperfect (Chang & Choi. 1988). To smooth out annual fluctuations in
accounting data, three-year averages for the 1993-1995 period were used. Relevant data
were obtained from Annual Corporation Reports for 1992-1995. In order to control
industry effects (Dess et al.. 1990). the average ROA o f the firm 's dominant tw o-digit
SIC industry group was subtracted from the firm 's ROA. Industry-level data was
obtained from Financial Statement Analysis for 1993-1995.

Control Variables and Covariates
Several control variables and covariates were used in the analysis. In testing the
hypotheses regarding core-business relatedness or corporate control type as an antecedent
o f division risk-taking strategy, firm size, a financial structure variable, and the existence
o f a trading company in a business group were used as control variables and covariates.
In addition, core-business relatedness and corporate control type were included as each
other's control variable because it is hypothesized that both will affect risky decision
making at the divisional level. In testing the suggested model for relative R&D
investment, firm size and one financial structure variable, the current ratio, were used.
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Firm size was measured by the natural logarithm o f Firm sales, which was used to control
for econom ies and diseconomies o f scale. The current ratio was used to control for the
effects o f funds available for allocation to research and developm ent. The current ratio is
a standard m easure o f liquidity and is the ratio o f current assets divided by current
liabilities.
On the other hand, the existence o f a trading company in a business group was
used as a control variable in testing the relationship between core-business relatedness
and internationalization or the relationship between corporate control type and
internationalization. Since 1975. Korea has adopted the general trading company system
for promoting the internationalization o f its economy.

Korean general trading companies

have been operated for gaining econom ies o f scale in the world m arket and attaining
international competitiveness through specialized export activities. The total exports by
the seven general trading companies accounted for 50.4 percent o f all Korean exports in
1997 ( The Korea Times. 1998).
Studies o f general trading com pany indicate that, with a centralized intermediary
approach, the general trading company facilitates trading activities and increases the
efficiency o f distribution o f goods (Cho. 1987; Kim. 1986). On the basis o f observations
and theoretical explanations, one can propose that the existence o f general trading
companies in a business group affects internationalization activities o f affiliated firms. It
was observed from A List o f 63 Largest K orean Business Groups and Their Subsidiaries
that while general trading companies are owned by the largest business groups, some
other business groups have regular trading companies as m em ber companies o f their
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groups. There has been no study about how different in terms o f activities for their
affiliated firms general trading com panies are from regular trading companies. Hence,
assuming that two types o f trading companies both perform a similar role for their
affiliated firms in the organization structure o f business groups, this study focuses on the
existence o f a trading company in a business group. A dummy variable indicating
whether a trading company exists in a business group was used to control for the possible
impact o f the general trading company on internationalization o f an affiliated firm.
In analyzing the interaction effect o f core-business relatedness and division risktaking strategy and the interaction effect o f corporate control type and division risk-taking
strategy on division's performance, firm size was used as a control variable. Firm size is
measured by the natural logarithm o f firm sales. In literature, there have been arguments
concerning the effect o f firm size on its innovation. Schumpeter (1961) and Galbraith
(1956) hypothesized that large firms and firms with extensive market power foster
technological innovation more efficiently than do small firms. However, contrary to this
hypothesis, empirical findings consistently suggest that small and medium-sized firms,
rather than large firms, conduct R&D more efficiently (Scherer. 1965: Schmookler.
1972). Three-vear averages for the 1993-1995 period were used for all control variables
and Covariates.
Core-business relatedness was used as a control variable when testing the
relationship between corporate control type, division risk-taking strategy, and division
performance. It is because, along with the hypotheses regarding interaction effects, this
study suggests the research hypothesis that core-business relatedness may influence
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division performance.
The industry effect, one o f most popular control variables in strategic
management research, was not employed in the analysis as a separate control variable. It
is because the effect was already controlled by dividing a firm 's value by the industry's
average value when measuring the variables which can be influenced by industry
membership. Those variables are division performance. R&D investment, and
internationalization. It is noted in strategy research that they are influenced by industry
membership and that findings derived from research design without industry control
result in misleading interpretations (Bettis & Hall. 1982: Dess et al.. 1990)

Statistical Analysis
The conceptual models presented in Chapter 2 were developed into six statistical
test models in Figure 3-1 to test the hypotheses developed. Several data analytic
techniques were employed to test the hypotheses. As mentioned above, cluster analysis
was used to identify member companies o f Korean business groups depending on three
types o f corporate control: full, centralized, and laissez-faire. T-tests. analysis of
variance (ANOVA), analysis o f covariance (ANCOVA). and multiple regression analysis
were used to test the hypotheses.
More specifically, the relationship between core-business relatedness and division
performance (Model A in Figure 3-1) was tested by using the r-test. The relationship
between core-business relatedness and corporate control (Model B) was tested by using
the r-test. Analysis o f variance was used to test the hypotheses concerning the roles o f
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FIGURE 3-1
M odels for Statistical Tests
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core-business relatedness as antecedents of risk-taking strategic behaviors (M odel C - l ).
The moderating effect o f core-business relatedness on the relationship division risktaking strategy and performance (Model C-2) was tested by performing multiple
regression analysis on the following model.

P E R F - b Q^ b l «C O R E +6, ~ RTS ~b . *C O R E - R T S - b ^ - C O N T R O L - e

(1)

where PERF refers to the division performance variable, industry-adjusted ROA: CORE
indicates core-business relatedness (dummy variable); RTS refers to a division's risktaking strategy, either R&D investment or internationalization: and CONTROL refers to
the control variable, firm size.
To test the hypotheses concerning the role o f corporate control as an antecedent o f
division risk-taking strategies, analysis o f covariance and multiple regression analysis
were used. M ultiple regression analysis was performed on the following model to test the
hypotheses focusing on the relationship between division risk-taking strategies and a
particular dimension o f the corporate control.

R T S - b 0 +b x • F I N C O N T + b 2 ~ O P R C O N T + b i - C O N T R O L + e

( 2)

where RTS indicates a division's risk-taking strategy, either R&D investment or
internationalization; FINC O N T refers to the dependence on financial control from the
corporate office; O PR C O N T indicates the centralization o f operating control at the
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corporate office: and CONTROL refers to one or more o f the control variables, firm size,
the current ratio, the existence o f a trading company, and core-business relatedness.
The following regression models were used to test the hypotheses concerning the
moderating role o f corporate control on the relationship between division's risk-taking
strategic behaviors and performance.

P E R F = b Q+b^ " C O R P C O N T x +b2 * C O R P C O N T 2 ~ b i - R T S + b 4 ■C O R P C O N T , - R T S -

b 4 « C O R P C O N T 2 * R T S + b s *C O N T R O L - e - ( 3 )

P E R F - b Q* b x "FINCONT-*-b2 " R T S +b 2 "FI NC ONT MRTS~b4 ‘CONTROL ~e (4)

PERF=ba~bx 'O P R C O N T +b2 -R T S + b 3 «O P R C O N T */?T5+64«CONTROL -e (5)

where PERF refers to the division performance variable, industry^-adjusted ROA:
CO RPC O N T indicates corporate control (dummy variable coding for full, centralized, or
laissez-faire): RTS refers to a variable o f division risk-taking strategy, either R&D
investment or internationalization: FIN C O N T refers to the dependence on financial
control from the corporate office; O PRCO N T indicates the centralization o f operating
control at the corporate office; and CONTROL refers to the control variables, firm size
and core-business relatedness.
As a summary of this chapter. Table 3-5 presents variables and data analytic
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techniques for each o f the research hypotheses. Table 3-6 then presents the measures
used to test the hypotheses.
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TABLE 3-5
Summary of Variables and Data Analytic Techniques for Research Hypotheses

1lypotheses

Dependent variables

Independent variables

Data analytic techniques

1

Industry-adjusted ROA

Core-business relatedness

- test

2a

Centralization o f operating
controls

Core-business relatedness

T - test

2b

Dependence on financial
controls

Core-business relatedness

T - test

3

R&D investment

Core-business relatedness. Corporate control
type, Finn size, Current ratio

- lest. Analysis of variance.
Analysis o f covariance

Internationalization

Core-business relatedness, Corporate control
type, trading company

T - test, Analysis of variance

Industry-adjusted ROA

Core-business relatedness, R&D investment,
Core-business relatedness X R&D
investment, Firm size

Multiple regression analysis

Core-business relatedness, Internationalization,
Core-business relatedness X Internationalization,
Firm size

Multiple regression analysis

4

00

1J
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TABLE 3-5 (continued)

Hypotheses
5a

5b

6a, 6b

Dependent variables

Independent variables

Data analytic techniques

R&D investment

Corporate control type, Core-business relatedness,
Firm size, Current ratio

7 - test, Analysis of variance,
Analysis o f covariance

Internationalization

Corporate control type, Core-business relatedness,
trading company

7 - test, Analysis o f variance

R&D investment

Dependence on financial controls. Centralization
o f operating controls. F irm size, Current ratio,
Core-business relatedness

Multiple regression analysis

Internationalization

Dependence on financial controls. Centralization
of operating controls, Trading company,
Core-business relatedness

Multiple regression analysis

Industry-adjusted ROA

Corporate control type, R&D investment.
Corporate control type X R&D investment.
Firm size, Core-business relatedness

Multiple regression analysis

Corporate control type. Internationalization,
Corporate control type X Internationalization,
Finn size, Core-business relatedness

Multiple regression analysis

00
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TABLE 3-5 (continued)

Hypotheses
6c, 6d

Dependent variables
Industry-adjusted ROA

Independent variables
Dependence on financial controls, R&D
investment, Dependence oHlnancial controls X
R&D investment, Firm size, Core-business
relatedness

Data analytic techniques
Multiple regression analysis

Dependence on financial controls, Internationalization, Multiple regression analysis
Dependence of financial controls X International
ization, Finn size, Core business relatedness
Centralization o f operating controls, R&D
investment, Centralization o f operating controls X
R&D investment, Firm size, Core-business
relatedness

Multiple regression analysis

Centralization of operating controls, international
ization, Centralization o f operating controls X
Internationalization, Firm size, Core business
relatedness

Multiple regression analysis

OO
-U
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TABLE 3-6
Summary of Measures

V ariables

M easures

C ore-b u sin ess relatedness

D u m m y variable coded according to w hether a d ivision
b e lo n g s to the sam e tw o-digit Korean SIC
industries as the core business o f its b u sin ess group

C orporate control ty pe

D u m m y variable coded according to the control typ es
resulting from cluster analysis o f three control dim ensions:
fu ll, centralized, and laissez-faire

C entralization o f
operating controls

T he m ean response o f survey q u estion s about the operating
control d im en sion o f the corporate control type configuration

D ep en d en ce on
financial controls

T he m ean response o f survey questions about the financial
control d im en sion o f the corporate control ty pe configuration

D iv isio n
risk-taking strategy
- R & D investm ent

- Internationalization

(Firm R&D expenditure/Firm total sa les)
(Industry R&D expenditure/industry total sales)

*

(Firm export sales/Firm total sa les)
(Industry export sales/industry total sa les)

*

D iv isio n perform ance
- Industry-adjusted
ROA” *

Firm 's average ROA
Industry's average ROA

*

Control variables
- Firm size
- Current ratio
- Trading com pany

- Natural logarithm o f firm sales*
- Current assets / Current liabilities*
- D um m y cod in g variable for the ex isten c e o f trading
com pany in a business group

* T hree-year averages for the 1 9 9 3 -1 9 9 5 period were used.
** R O A (return on a ssets) is m easured as N et Income/Total A ssets.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

This chapter presents the results obtained from the statistical analyses designed to
test the hypotheses. The descriptive statistics and correlations for all the variables
included in the study are presented in the first section. The results o f testing the
hypotheses are then followed.

Descriptive Statistics
Table 4-1 presents the descriptive statistics and intercorrelations o f all the
variables included in hypothesized models. As shown in the table, intercorrelations
among the independent variables were sufficiently low to preclude the problem o f
unstable coefficients that may rise because o f multicollinearity. Although the sam ple
consisted of 57 affiliated firms, complete data could not be obtained for all variables. For
the variable o f internationalization, one firm was excluded because it did not have any
export activity.

Results of Testing Hypotheses
This section presents the results o f the various statistical analyses perform ed to
test the hypotheses. The results are organized for each o f the hypotheses stated in
Chapter 3.
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TABLE 4-1
Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrclations of the Variables in the Study

Variables

N

Mean

S.D.

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

Dependence on
financial controls

57

2.407

0.644

2

Centralization o f
operating controls

57

1.882

0.473

-0.149

3

Strategic control

57

3.611

0.551

-0.052

-0 .5 9 8 “

4

R&D investment

57

1.968

1.359

0.290

-0.330**

0.153

5

Internationalization

56

1.697

1.600

-0 .2 4 4 “

0 .4 2 8 “

-0.182*

6

Return on assets

57

-1.186

3.660

0.126

0.138

-0.020

0.221*

0 .3 2 3 “

7

firm size

57

12.557

1.565

0.057

-0 .3 9 7 “

0 .2 9 3 “

0.178*

-0.114

0.084

8

Current ratio

57

100.083 37.494

0.218

-0 .2 4 1 “

0.139

0.184*

-0.194*

0.102

+ p ' 0 .1 0 ;*

7

-0 .1 3 0

0.021

p < 0.05; ** p < 0.001
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Core-business Relatedness and Division Performance
Hypothesis 1 states that divisions related to the core-business outperform
divisions not related to the core business. The relationship was analyzed by using a Mest.
Table 4-2 shows the results o f the Mest. The results suggest a significant difference in
financial performance between divisions related to the core business and divisions not
related to the core business (r55 = - 1.96. p = 0.055). The finding supports Hypothesis 1.

TABLE 4-2
T-test for Division Performance

Source

n

Means (SD)

Core business

30

-0.3067 (2.929)

Non-core business

27

-2.1626 (4.171)

T- value

Probability

-1.96

0.055

Core-business Relatedness and Corporate Control
Hypothesis 2a states that divisions related to the core business show a tighter
operating controls from the corporate office than do divisions not related to the core
business. Hypothesis 2b states that divisions not related to the core business show a
tighter financial controls from the corporate office than do divisions not related to the
core business. Those relationships were analyzed by using a Mest. Table 4-3 displays the
results of the Mest. The results suggest no significant difference in financial and
operating control between divisions with or without core-business relatedness (/„ = 0.28.
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p = 0.779 for operating control; t« = -0.25. p = 0.802 for financial control). These
findings do not support Hypotheses 2a and 2b. The results suggest that the firm does not
differentiate its corporate control according to the differences in core-business relatedness
at the divisional level.

TABLE 4-3
F-test for Corporate Control
(A) Dependent variable: centralization o f operating control

n

Means (SD)

Core business

30

1.8652(0.436)

Non-core business

27

1.9010(0.519)

Source

F-value

Probability

0.28

0.779

(B) Dependent variable: dependence on financial control

Source
Core business

n

Means (SD)

30

2.4273 (0.643)

F-value

Probability

-0.25
Non-core business

27

0.802

2.3838 (0.656)

Core-business Relatedness and Division Risk-taking Strategy
Hypothesis 3 states that divisions related to the core-business show a higher
commitment to risk-taking strategies than do divisions not related to the core business.
The data were analyzed using analysis o f variance and analysis o f covariance. The
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proposed relationships o f core-business relatedness was analyzed for two indicators o f
division risk-taking strategy: R&D investment and internationalization.
Core-business Relatedness and R&D Investment.

The effect o f core-business

relatedness was analyzed after controlling for three potential interv ening variables: firm
size, current ratio, and corporate control type. A nalysis o f covariance and tw o-factor
analysis o f variance were used to control for the effects o f the intervening variables.
These analyses were chosen in lieu o f one covariance analysis because a model including
core-business relatedness and all three control variables failed to satisfy' one o f the
assumptions o f covariance analysis: unequal slopes o f different corporate control type
regression lines for firm size and current ratio. The unequal slopes mean that the
regression lines o f three different corporate control types interact with the covariates. firm
size and current ratio. Thus, covariance analysis is not appropriate for the statistical
model that includes core-business relatedness and all three control variables.
For analysis o f covariance, firm size and current ratio were used as covariates.
Prior to analysis, the following assumptions o f analysis o f covariance were tested for the
data: normality o f error terms, constancy o f error variances, equality o f slopes o f the
different treatm ent regression lines, and uncorrelatedness o f error terms. The results o f
the assumption test suggested that nonconstancy o f error terms existed in the data. To
stabilize the nonconstancy, a logarithmic transformation was used on the m easure o f
R&D investment. As shown in Table 4-4. core-business relatedness is still statistically
significant at the p < 0.05 level after controlling for the effects o f two covariates (F , 5(S=
4.051. p = 0.049). This result show that the difference in R&D investment between
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divisions related and unrelated to the core business exists after controlling for the
intervening effects o f firm size and current ratio.

TABLE 4-4
Analysis of Covariance for the Relationship Between Core-business Relatedness and
R&D Investment

Source
Core-business relatedness
Covariates
Firm size
Current ratio
Overall model

/•'-value

Probability

4.05
2.56
4.06
1.06
3.06

0.049
0.087
0.049
0.309
0.036

Two-factor analysis of variance was conducted to control for the effect o f
corporate control type and potential interaction effects between corporate control and
core-business relatedness. Prior to analysis, the following assumptions o f analysis of
variance were tested for the data: normality o f error terms, constancy o f error variances,
and independence o f error terms. The results o f this assumption test suggested that a
nonconstancy o f error terms existed in the data. To stabilize the nonconstancy, a
logarithmic transformation was used on the measure of R&D investment. As the results
in Table 4-5 suggest, the relationship between core-business relatedness and R&D
investment is still significant at the/? < 0.05 level. The findings support Hypothesis 3.
The results o f two analyses support that divisions related to the core business have more
commitment to R&D investment than do divisions unrelated to the core business.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

92

TABLE 4-5
Two-factor Analysis of Variance for R&D Investment

Source
Core-business relatedness
Corporate control type
Interaction
Overall model

F-value
4.07
6.33
0.72
3.64

Core-business Relatedness and Internationalization.

Probability
0.049
0.004
0.490
0.007

Three-factor analysis o f

variance was conducted to control for the effects o f potential intervening variables: the
existence of a trading company, corporate control, and their interactions with corebusiness relatedness. Prior to analysis, the assumptions o f analysis o f variance were
tested for the data. Nonconstancy o f error terms was found from the assumption test. To
stabilize the nonconstancy, a logarithmic transformation was used on the measure o f
internationalization.
Table 4-6 presents the analysis o f variance results o f testing the effects o f corebusiness relatedness on internationalization. The model was not statistically significant
(p = 0.399) and thus could not be interpreted. Hypothesis 3 was not supported for the
relationship between core-business relatedness and internationalization. In summary.
Hypothesis 3 received partial support. The results support the positive effect o f corebusiness relatedness on R&D investment. However, the effect o f core-business
relatedness on internationalization was not supported.
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TABLE 4-6
Three-factor Analysis of Variance for Internationalization

S ou rce

/•"-value

Probability

M ain e ffe c ts
C o re-b u sin ess relatedness
C orporate control type
Trading co m p a n y

0.13
1.98
1.23

0 .720
0.151
0.273

Interaction e ffe c ts
C ore b u sin ess X Corporate control
C ore b u sin ess X Trading com pany
C orporate control X Trading com pany
T h ree-w ay interaction

0 .5 0
0 .5 6
1.84
0.23

0.611
0 .457
0.171
0 .634

O verall m odel

1.08

0 .399

Core-business Relatedness as Moderator
Hypothesis 4 states that the relationship between division risk-taking strategy and
performance is moderated by the division's relatedness to the firm 's core business. It was
expected that the interaction between a division's relatedness to a corporate core business
and division risk-taking strategy would be positive. To examine this contingency
hypothesis, the data were analyzed using moderated regression analysis that included the
interaction term o f core-business relatedness and division risk-taking strategy. The
relationship was analyzed by two measures o f division risk-taking strategy: R&D
investment and internationalization. They were referred to as Model 1 and Model 2.
respectively. Prior to analysis, the following assum ptions were tested for the data:
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multivariate normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. No serious violation was found
for both statistical models.
The relationship between R&D investment and division perform ance was
analyzed for the effect o f a contingency variable, core-business relatedness. Table 4-7
presents the results o f the regression analysis that show how R&D investment, core-

TABLE 4-7
Regression Analysis for Moderating Effects of Core-business Relatedness'

Independent variables

Dependent variable = Industry-adjusted ROA
j

Model 1
Intercept
Core-business relatedness
R&D investment

-3.512
(-0.912)
-0.602
(-0.340)
-0.255
(-0.422)

R;
F

-6.94 r
(-1.848)
2.535(1.925)

:

1.112
(1.456)
-0.538
(-0.930)

Core-business relatedness X
Internationalization
Firm size

I
|
;
j

Model 2

0.980“
(2.759)

Internationalization
Core-business relatedness X
R&D investment

j

0.144
(0.447)

0.245
(0.841)

0.127
1.898

0.192*
3.038

+ p < . 1 0 ; * p < .05; ** p < .01
1f-statistics in parentheses
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business relatedness, and their interaction affect industry-adjusted R.OA at the divisional
level. The designed regression model (Model 1) was not statistically significant at the p
= 0.10 level (F 452 = 1.898.p = 0.125) and thus could not be interpreted.
The moderating effect o f core-business relatedness was analyzed using
internationalization as a division's risk-taking strategy. As shown in Table 4-7. the
designed regression model (Model 2) was statistically significant (Z*'45, = 3.038. p 0.025) and thus, the results o f the model could be interpreted. In Model 2. the coefficient
of the interaction term of core-business relatedness and internationalization was not
statistically significant (p = 0.3568). This result does not provide support for Hypothesis
4. No support was found for the moderating effect o f core-business relatedness in either
Model 1 or Model 2.

Corporate Control and Division Risk-taking Strategy
Hypothesis 5a states that divisions under centralized corporate controls show a
higher commitment to risk-taking strategies than do their counterparts under full
corporate controls or laissez-faire corporate controls. Hypothesis 5b states that divisions
under full corporate controls show’ a higher commitment to risk-taking strategies than do
their counterparts under laissez-faire corporate controls. The relationships between
corporate control type and division risk-taking strategy were analyzed with the two
indicators o f division risk-taking strategy: R&D investment and internationalization.
Corporate Control and R&D investment. As discussed above, because a model
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including corporate control type and all three control variables failed to satisfy one o f the
assumptions of covariance analysis, two analyses were conducted to analyze the
relationship between corporate control and R&D investment. First, a two-factor analysis
o f variance was applied for the data. In this analysis, core-business relatedness was
considered as a control variable and potential interaction effects between corporate
control and core-business relatedness were also controlled. Prior to analysis, the
assumptions of analysis o f variance were examined. From the results of the assum ption
test, a nonconstancy o f error terms was found. To stabilize the nonconstancy, logarithmic
transformation was used on the measure o f R&D investment. As shown in Table 4-5. the
main effect of corporate control on R&D investment was statistically significant (F :.55 =
6.33. p = 0.004).
To compare the means o f the three corporate control types, the Tukey method o f
multiple comparisons was performed. Figure 4-1 summarizes the results o f the
comparisons. The nonsignificant difference between two control types is indicated by
underlining and the significant difference is indicated by no line. There is no clear
evidence of the difference in R&D investment between centralized and full corporate
control. The difference between laissez-faire and full control wras not statistically
significant. The results suggest that there is a significant difference between centralized
and laissez-faire control. Consequently, the results suggest a significant effect o f
corporate control on R&D investment.
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FIGURE 4-1
Results of the Tukey Method of Multiple Comparisons
(0.1086) (0.1579)
Centralized Full
LX
X ____
0.1
0.2

(0.3566)
Laissez-faire

X
0.3

I
0.4

However, the results of pairwise com parisons among the three control types
indicate that the findings were opposite to the prediction in Hypotheses 5a and 5b. That
means that divisions under laissez-faire corporate control have a higher com m itm ent to
R&D investment than do divisions under centralized corporate control. Although the
findings do not support Hypotheses 5a and 5b. the support for the opposite is significant.
This point will be fully discussed in Chapter 5.
As the second test, the analysis o f covariance was planned to control for the
potential effects o f firm size and the current ratio on R&D investment. The results o f the
assumption check showed unequal slopes o f different corporate control type regression
lines for firm size and the current ratio. The test o f parallel slopes was conducted by
evaluating the statistical difference between a m odel with the interaction between
corporate control and two concomitant variables and a model without the interaction.
The test results indicate that there is significant difference between the two m odels (FZAq
= 2408.03). It means that the nonequality o f slopes o f different control type regression
lines is statistically significant.
To evaluate the nonequality in more detail, separate regression lines were
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estimated for each o f the three corporate control types and then compared.

As shown in

Table 4-8. it was found that the regression lines for corporate control types interact with
the concom itant variables, firm size and the current ratio in the form o f nonparallel
slopes. Therefore, covariance analysis was not appropriate for the model including
corporate control type and all two concom itant variables.

TABLE 4-8
Comparisons o f Estimated Regression Lines
(A) Dependent variable: R&D investment
Independent variable: firm size (natural logarithmatic transformed)

Types
Centralized
Full
Laissez-faire

n

Slope

23
11
22

0.1233
-0.3932
0.0253

Intercept
-0.0103
6.6028
2.3485

(B) Dependent variable: R&D investment
Independent variable: the current ratio

Types
Centralized
Full
Laissez-faire

n
23
11
22

Slope
0.00059
0.00322
0.00544

Intercept
1.4118
1.3990
2.0776
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Instead, analysis o f covariance was conducted only for corporate control types
which satisfy the assum ption o f equal slopes o f treatment regression lines. The results o f
assumption examination showed that covariance analysis is appropriate for the data from
two control types: centralized and laissez-faire corporate control. The slope o f the
regression line o f centralized control was equal to that o f laissez-faire control (F, 4, =
.005). Table 4-9 shows the results o f analysis o f covariance. After controlling for firm
size and the current ratio effects, the main effect o f corporate control type was statistically
significant. However, the adjusted means for two control types were not found as
hypothesized (0.1086 and 0.3566 for centralized and laissez-faire corporate control,
respectively).

TABLE 4-9
Analysis of Covariance for the Relationship Between Corporate Control and R&D
Investment (n= 45)

Source
Corporate control type
Covariates
Firm size
Current ratio
Overall model

F-value
6.223
0.966
1.896
0.035
4.483

Probability
0.017
0.389
0.176
0.853
0.008

In summary. Hypotheses 5a and 5b were not supported in the case o f R&D
investment. The results show that corporate control type affects division R&D
investment. However, the results o f pairwise comparisons among the three control types
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were opposite to predictions in Hypotheses 5a and 5b.
Corporate Control and Internationalization.

A three-way analysis o f variance

was conducted to analyze the relationship between corporate control type and
internationalization. In the analysis, core-business relatedness and the existence o f a
trading company w ere included and the effects o f their potential interaction with control
type were considered in testing hypotheses. Prior to analysis, the assumptions o f analysis
o f variance was examined. From the results o f assum ption evaluation, a nonconstancy o f
error terms was found. To stabilize the nonconstancy. logarithmic transformation was
used on the measure o f internationalization. Table 4-6 in the earlier section presents the
results. As shown, the tested variance model was not statistically significant again (p =
0.399) and thus, could not be interpreted. These results did not support the effect o f
corporate control on internationalization. Hypotheses 5a. and 5b about differences in
commitment to risk-taking between control types were not supported either by the results
o f the model with internationalization as a measure o f division risk-taking strategy.
In summary. Hypotheses 5a and 5b were not supported. Regarding the
relationship between corporate control and R&D investment, inconsistent with
Hypothesis 5a, it was found that divisions under laissez-faire control were more
committed to R&D investment than divisions under centralized control. Regarding the
relationship between corporate control and internationalization, the tested models w'ere
not significant and thus could not be interpreted.
Hypothesis 5c states that dependence on financial controls from the corporate
office is negatively related to a division's commitment to risk-taking strategies.
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Hypothesis 5d states that centralization in operating controls from the corporate office is
positively related to a division's com m itm ent to risk-taking strategies. The influence of
each dimension o f corporate control was analyzed with two indicators o f division risktaking strategy: R&D investment and internationalization. They were referred to as
Model 1 and Model 2. respectively.
First, the relationship between two dim ensions o f corporate control and R&D
investment was analyzed. The results o f the assumption check indicated that the
assumption o f homoscedasticity o f residuals is violated. To improve the
homoscedasticity. a natural logarithmic transform ation was used on the measure o f R&D
investment. Table 4-10 presents the results o f regression analysis.

M odel 1 was

statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level (F 55I = 4.580. p - 0.001). accounting for
approximately 31 percent of the variance in R&D investment. The degree o f dependance
on financial control was significantly (p = 0.078) and positively related to R&D
investment, supporting Hypothesis 5c. The degree o f dependence on operating control
was statistically significant (p = 0.007) and negatively related to R&D investment, not
supporting Hypothesis 5d. Even though the expected association o f operating control and
R&D investment was found statistically significant, the sign o f the relationship was
contrary to the hypothesized sign.
In sum. Hypothesis 5c was supported but 5d was not supported when testing the
effects o f two control dimensions on R&D investment. The results suggest that as the
dependence on financial controls from the corporate office increases, the division's R&D
investment decreases and that the centralization o f operating decisions increases, the
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division's R&D investment decreases.

TABLE 4-10
Regression Analysis for the Relationship Between Financial and Operating Control
and Risk-taking Strategies'

Dependent variables

Independent variables
Model 1
Intercept
Financial control
Operating control
Core-business relatedness
Firm size
Current ratio

0.473
(0.511)
0.210+
(1.800)
-0.486'*
(-2.788)
0.330’
(2.231)
0.018
(0.344)
0.000165
(0.080)

Model
2
.
.
-1.522+
(-1.740)
-0.051
(-0.240)
0.779”
(2.735)
0.124
(0.448)

0.416
(1.477)

Trading company

R2
F

..

0.310”
4.580

0.148*
2.217

~ p < . 1 0 ; * p < .05; ** p < .01
’/-statistics in parentheses

Secondly, the relationship between financial and operating controls and
internationalization was analyzed. The results o f an assumption examination indicated
that the assumption o f homoscedasticity o f residuals is violated. To improve the
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homoscedasticity. a natural logarithmic transformation was used on the measure o f
internationalization. Table 4-10 presents the results o f regression analysis.

Model 2 was

statistically significant at the/? < 0.10 level ( F 451 = 2.217. p = 0.080). and explained
about 15 percent o f the variance in internationalization. Although the dependance on
financial control was positively related to internationalization, it was not statistically
significant, not supporting Hypothesis 5c (p = 0.811). The degree o f centralization o f
operating decisions was statistically significant (p = 0.008) and positively related to
R&D investment, supporting Hypothesis 5d. Therefore. Hypothesis 5c was not supported
but Hypothesis 5d was supported. These findings indicate that the effect o f the
dependence on financial control is not significant and that the centralization o f operating
decisions influences positively the division's internationalization.
In summary, the results provided partial support for Hypotheses 5c and 5d. It
was found that financial control was not significantly related to internationalization but it
was significantly related to R&D investment. The results indicated significant
relationships o f operating control with both measures o f division risk-taking strategies.
Even though the relationship was significant, the direction o f the relationship between
operating control and R&D investment was opposite to the prediction in Hypothesis 5d.
The predicted direction was found on the relationship between operating control and
internationalization.

Corporate Control as a Moderator
Hypothesis 6a states that the relationship between division risk-taking strategy
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and division performance is moderated by corporate control type. It was expected that
divisions under centralized control would exhibit higher performance at risk-taking
strategies than would divisions under the two other control types. Table 4-11 presents the
regression analysis results to show how division risk-taking strategies, corporate control
type, and their interactions affect division performance. Two regression models are
presented in the table: Model 1 includes R&D investment as an indicator o f division risktaking strategy and M odel 2 uses internationalization as the indicator. Prior to analysis,
the following assumptions were tested for the data: multivaraite normality, linearity, and
homoscedasticity. No serious violation was found for either statistical model.
As shown in the table. Model 1 was not statistically significant ( F 748 = 0.867. p =
0.539) and could not be interpreted. Model 2 was statistically significant at the p = 0.10
level (F754 = 2.183. p = 0.053). accounting for approximately 25 percent of the variance
o f industry-adjusted ROA. The results indicate no significant interaction effect between
corporate control and division risk-taking strategy. Therefore. Hypothesis 6a was not
supported in both Model 1 and Model 2. The findings suggest that corporate control type
does not moderate the relationship between division's risk-taking strategy and
performance.
Hypotheses 6b and 6c focused on particular dimensions o f corporate control type.
Table 4-12 presents the regression analysis results for moderating effects of financial
controls. Again, two regression models are presented in the table: Model 1 includes
R&D investment as an indicator o f division risk-taking strategy and Model 2 uses
internationalization as the indicator. Hypothesis 6b states that the relationship

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

105
TABLE 4-11
R egression Analysis for M oderating Effects o f Corporate C ontrol1

Independent variables_______ j_______ Dependent variable = Industry-adjusted ROA
M odel 1
Intercept
R&D investm ent

-5.124
(-1.042)
0.669
(1.355)

Full

Model 2
-6.279
(-1.482)

'
i
-0.580
(-0.459)

Internationalization
Corporate control type:
Centralized

i

1.641
(0.654)
1.043
(0.402)

-2.128
(-1.129)
-1.340
(-0.684)

Laissez-faire
R&D investm ent X
Centralized type
R&D investment X
Full type
Internationalization X
Centralized type
Internationalization X
Full type
Firm size
Core-business relatedness

R:
F

-0.295
(-0.233)
-0.487
(-0.432)

0.098
(0.275)
1.671
(1.516)

1.828
(1.363)
1.049
(0.776)
0.326
(1.018)
2.059*
(1.925)

0.112
0.867

0.245+
2.183

+ /? < 0.10 : * p < 0.05 : * * p < 0 . 0 1
1/-statistics in parentheses
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TABLE 4-12
Regression Analysis for M oderating Effects of Financial Control'

Independent variables_______;_______ Dependent variable - Industry-adjusted ROA
j
M odel 1
Intercept
R&D investment

-5.124
(-1.042)
-1.273
(-0.875)

Internationalization
Dependence on Financial
control
R&D investment X
Financial control
Internationalization X
Financial control
Firm size
Core-business relatedness

R:
F

-0.947
(-0.675)
0.617
(1.183)

j

Model 2

!

-10.531*
(-2.333)

j
2.305+
(1.782)
1.787
(1.596)

0.017
(0.053)
1.750"*’
(1.732)

-0.706
(-1.152)
0.226
(0.780)
1.689+
(1.877)

0.121
1.408

0.219*
2.799

- p < 0 . 1 0 : * p < 0 . 0 5 : * * p < 0 .Q l
' /-statistics in parentheses

between division risk-taking strategy and division performance is moderated by
dependence on financial controls. As shown in the table. Model 1 was not statistically
significant and could not be interpreted (F s 55 = 1.408. p = 0.237). On the other hand.
Model 2 was statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level (F 555 = 2.799. p = 0.026).
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accounting for approximately 22 percent o f the variance o f industry-adjusted ROA. The
results indicate no significant interaction effect between financial control and
internationalization, not supporting Hypothesis 6b. Consequently, the prediction was not
supported in both Model 1 and Model 2.
Hypothesis 6c states that the relationship between division risk-taking strategy
and division performance is moderated by centralization o f operating control. The
positive sign was expected from the interaction term o f centralization o f operating control
and division risk-taking strategy. Table 4-13 presents the relevant regression analysis
results. Model 1 and Model 2 both were statistically significant at the p < 0.10 level (F<<6
= 2.349. p = 0.054 and Fs 55 = 2.315. p = 0.057. respectively). Model 1 accounted for
approximately 19 percent o f the variance o f industry-adjusted ROA. As shown in the
table. Hypothesis 6c was not supported in Model 1. Even though it had the sign as
expected, it was not significant at the p - 0.10 level (p = 0.1195).
Hypothesis 6c was not supported in Model 2. either. As the results in the table
indicate. Model 2 accounted for 18.8 percent o f the variance o f industry-adjusted ROA.
Even though it had a positive sign, the interaction term o f operating control and
internationalization was found to be not statistically significant (p = 0.497). In summary.
Hypothesis 6c was not supported. No significant interaction effect was found in either
Model 1 or Model 2. The results suggest that there is no clear evidence that two control
dimensions moderate the relationship between division risk-taking strategy and
performance. The results o f testing all hypotheses are summarized in Table 4-14.
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TABLE 4-13
Regression Analysis for M oderating Effects o f Operating Control1

Independent variables

Intercept
R&D investment

Dependent variable = Industry-adjusted ROA
Model 1

Model 2

-6.669
(-1.143)
-1.912
(-1.148)

-6.538
(-1.238)

Internationalization
Centralization of Operating
control
R&D investment X
Operating control
Internationalization X
Operating control
Firm size
Core-business relatedness

R2
F

-0.220
(-0.120)
1.448
(1.154)

-0.242
(-0.166)
-0.259
(-0.178)

0.325
(0.980)
0.994
(1.005)

0.425
(0.684)
0.302
(0.931)
2.059+
(1.734)

0.187'"
2.349

0.188"
2.315

+ p < 0.10 : * p < 0.05 : ** p < 0.01
1/-statistics in parentheses
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TABLE 4-14
Results of Testing Hypotheses

1fypotlieses
1:

D ivisions related to the core business outperform divisions not related to the core business.

Results
Supported

2a: D ivisions related to the core business receive a tighter operating controls from the
corporate o ffice than do divisions not related to the core business.

Not supported

2b: D ivisions not related to the core business receive a tighter financial control from the
corporate o ffice than do divisions related to the core business.

Not supported

3:

D ivisions related to the core business show a higher com m itm ent to risk-taking strategies
than do divisions not related to the core business.

Supported by R& D investment
Not supported by internationalization

4:

The relationship betw een division risk-taking strategy and division performance is

Not supported

moderated by the d iv isio n ’s relatedness to the firm ’s core business.
5a: D ivisions under cenlrali/.ed corporate controls show a higher com m itm ent to risk-taking
strategies than do their counterparts under full corporate controls or laissez-faire
corporate controls.
5b: D ivisions under full corporate controls show a higher com m itm ent to risk-taking
strategies than do their counterparts under laissez-faire corporate controls.

Not supported
(support was found for the opposite)

Not supported

o
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TABLE 4-14 (continued)

1lypotlieses
5c: D ependence on financial controls front the corporate o ffic e is negatively related to
a d iv isio n ’s com m itm ent to risk-taking strategies.

Results
Supported by R & l) investm ent
Not supported by internationalization

5d: Centralization o f operating controls from the corporate o ffic e is positively related
a d iv isio n 's com m itm ent to risk-taking strategies.

Not supported by R & l) investment
Supported by internationalization

6a: The relationship between division risk-taking strategy and division performance is
moderated by the corporate control type (i.e., full, centralized, or laissez-faire)

Not supported

6b: The relationship between division risk-taking strategy and division performance is

Not supported

moderated by dependence on financial control: the interaction between dependence on
financial control and division risk-taking strategy is negatively related to division
performance.
6c: The relationship between division risk-taking strategy and division performance is
moderated by centralization o f operating control: the interaction between centralization
o f operating control and division risk-taking strategy is positively related to division
performance.

Not supported

o

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This research explored two major functions o f corporate strategic management,
diversification and corporate control, and their implications for divisional management.
Specifically, this study examined the implications o f diversification for corporate control,
division risk-taking strategies, and division performance. It also focused on the dual roles
o f corporate control as an antecedent o f division risk-taking strategy and as a moderator
o f the relationship between division risk-taking strategy and performance.
The findings o f the present study suggest that core-business relatedness is related
to both division risk-taking strategy and performance and that corporate control is related
to division risk-taking strategy. The results also indicate that different risk-taking
strategies are related differently to core-business relatedness and corporate control. This
chapter summarizes the findings and discusses their theoretical and managerial
implications. The limitations o f this study and some directions for future research are
also presented.

Discussion of Main Findings
The discussion o f the main findings is organized for each o f the research
questions: (1) Does core-business relatedness matter to division performance? (2) How
does core-business relatedness influence corporate control? (3) How does core-business
relatedness influence division risk-taking strategy and performance? and (4) How does
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corporate control influence division risk-taking strategies and performance?

Core-business Relatedness and Division Performance
This study found that divisions that are closely related to the corporation's core
business were more profitable than those that are unrelated. As a further analysis,
performance o f divisions related to core business was com pared w ith that o f divisions
unrelated to core business after controlling for the effect o f business groups. In the
research sample, eleven o f thirty-two business groups had both related and unrelated
affiliated companies responded to this study's survey. Related and unrelated divisions in
each o f eleven business groups were compared in terms o f industry-adjusted ROA. The
results showed that related divisions outperformed consistently unrelated divisions in six
out o f eleven business groups. Mixed results were observed in three business groups, but
in only two business groups, unrelated divisions outperformed related divisions. These
results confirm the hypothesis that divisions related to core business outperform divisions
unrelated.
These findings support the previous findings o f M ahajan and W ind's (1988) and
Davis and his colleagues' (1992) studies that business units w ith relatedness are more
profitable compared to those that have less relatedness. The present study's findings also
support theoretical argum ents suggested by Rumelt (1974) and his followers that related
diversification can have a positive impact on performance by allow ing firms to make
better use o f the resources o f a core business or to share resources across related
businesses.
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The findings also support Prahalad and H am el's (1990) argument that, for
achieving a competitive edge for long-term success, each part o f a corporate portfolio
m ust contribute to the core competencies that a corporation seeks to build and exploit.
The findings imply that if the corporation is unable to transfer a core competence from a
core business to other businesses, they are wasting their resources. As Goold and
colleagues (1993) indicated, the corporate office has the potential to create or to destroy
the value of its divisions or units. For the current sample, a corporate office is more
likely to create significant value for its divisions which are related to its core business
than for unrelated divisions. That may be because it is easier for corporate offices to
coordinate the activities o f its divisions which are closely related to each other in
exploiting and sharing core competencies than the activities o f unrelated divisions.
Divisions unrelated to the core business would not be able to benefit from core
competencies o f the corporation created by the corporate office and/or other businesses.
These findings indicate that a stick-to-the-knitting strategy o f a firm that limits
diversification to the core business can create value for its divisions through the
advantage o f being under one corporate umbrella.
An important contribution o f this study resides in examining core-business
relatedness at the divisional level rather than at the corporate level. The approach used in
this study is different from that o f earlier diversification studies. While the earlier studies
fixed their attention to studying the diversification-performance link at the corporate
level, this research exam ines the core-business relatedness and its impact on perform ance
at the divisional level. Studying at the divisional level is better in understanding the
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effect between diversification on perform ance than studying at the corporate level. The
value o f relatedness realized at some divisions can be offset by the financial problems of
divisions not related to the core business. This value can not be captured when
investigating the relationship between relatedness and performance at the corporate level.

Core-business Relatedness and Corporate Control
The relationship between core-business relatedness and corporate control was
viewed from a strategic fit perspective. It was suggested that divisions related to the core
business would be under centralized operating control and moderate financial control
from their corporate office because business activities of the divisions needed to be
coordinated for achieving synergy effects. On the other hand, it was hypothesized that
divisions unrelated to the core business would be under operational autonomy and tight
financial control because there is no synergy that can be achieved by close coordination
w'ith their corporate office and with other unrelated divisions. The proposed effect o f
core-business relatedness was not observed from the results. As Table 5-1 presents, the
results o f a further analysis confirm no significant differences in corporate control
between two division groups. This m eans that corporate offices in Korean business
groups do not differentiate their control types between divisions related to their core
businesses and divisions unrelated.
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TABLE 5-1
Corporate Control Types between Core Business and Non-core Business Divisions

Corporate Control Type
Laissez-faire
Full
Centralized

Core Business Divisions

Non-core Business Divisions

13
5
11

9
6
12

Four possible reasons can be suggested for the lack o f differentiated corporate
controls. First, decentralization o f operating decision-making might be primarily a reward
for performance rather than a corporate strategy-dependent design variable (Gupta. 1987).
Regardless o f the difference in core-business relatedness, the corporate office might not
interfere with the operation at the divisional level if its division performs superbly.
Interpreting decentralization as a reward has been suggested in organization design
studies. For example, Vancil (1979) suggested that when a division's or unit's
performance fell below corporate office's expectations, intervention would be offered by
corporate managers and the divisional managers' authority w ould tend to be curtailed.
Lorsch and Allen (1973) observed that the amount o f supervision from the corporate
office is positively related to the troubles faced by the division or unit.
Second, coordination and cooperation between core-business related divisions
might not need a high degree o f centralization of operating decisions. It has been
suggested that coordination and cooperation are required to achieve synergistic effects
(Rumelt, 1974; Hill & Hoskisson. 1987) and that some degree o f centralization is
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required to understand the tim ing when coordination is needed across divisions and
business activities in which coordination and cooperation m ust be achieved (M intzberg.
1983). This argum ent is based on the premise that inform ation symmetry and goal
congruence are necessary conditions for effective coordination and cooperation.
How'ever. if these requisites can be obtained by other m anagem ent systems, a high degree
o f centralization may not always be needed for effective coordination and cooperation.
For example, corporate m anagers' understanding o f the core business may be achieved by
their long tenure. The purposes and methods o f coordinating and cooperating betw een
divisions can be recognized and routinized through a long history o f interaction among
divisional managers. At the initial stage o f coordination, divisions need intervention
from the corporate office. Once the routine is established, coordination and cooperation
activities conducted by divisions can be achieved through informal personal contacts
Goal congruence for coordination and cooperation activities can be obtained by a
well developed socialization system rather than centralization o f operating control.
Control theorists have established the notion o f clan (e.g.. Ouchi. 1980; Das. 1989). They
argued that m ultibusiness firms can employ a clan m ode for controlling their divisions or
units (Ouchi, 1984). Unlike outcome and behavior control, clan control is based on a
well developed socialization system within an organization. Organizations with clan
control are social enclaves consisting o f companies and individuals who are bound by
strong, non-contractual bonds (Chan, 1997). The glue which holds them together is a
shared vision o f their needs, their goals and their approved ways in which things should
be done. It has been suggested that the social structure o f Far East Asian family business
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groups, including Korean business groups and Japanese keiretsus. can be characterized as
clan organization (Chan. 1997). As far as information symmetry and goal congruence
can be achieved by a clan system and a long history o f interaction between corporate
office and divisions, there is no need for differentiating corporate control.
Third, finding a strategic fit between corporate diversification and control system
is a challenging task. To achieve the necessary strategic fit. managers must be aware of
interactional requirements between the corporate office and its divisions and among the
divisions to choose an appropriate control system. Also the impacts that a corporate
control system has on the behavior o f divisional managers must be understood.
M anagers are often confused about the negative behavioral consequences o f their
controlling efforts due to a lack o f understanding o f interactional requirements and
dysfunctional aspects of control systems (Tannenbaum. 1968; Galbraith. 1977). An
example can be found in the case o f Texana Petroleum Corporation (reported by Lorsch.
Lawrence. & Garrison. 1992). Texana is a divisionalized company with related
diversification. Close cooperation and coordination are needed among the related
divisions, and yet the corporate office exercises formal financial control systems that
cause the divisional managers to be at odd with each other. Similar problems can occur
in Korean firms. Because Korean managers do not fully understand the interactional
requirements between hierarchical levels and among business units, they may choose to
exercise a uniform corporate control system across related and unrelated business units
rather than attempting to differentiate their control systems.
Finally, bureaucratic costs for coordinating divisions may influence the need for
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centralization o f operating control (Hill & Jones. 1998). In order to achieve operating
synergies from related businesses, coordination between the corporate office and its
divisions must be realized to create value from skill transfers and resource sharing.
Centralization o f operating control is required to closely coordinate activities among
related divisions (Hill. 1988; Hill & Hoskisson. 1987). Although divisions related to
core business can create value from operating synergies, they should bear higher
bureaucratic costs that arises from coordination among related divisions (Hill & Jones.
1998). Because managers have different personal and professional interests and are
pressure to perform, genuine coordination among those divisions cannot be easilyexpected. This difficulty o f achieving effective coordination often nullifies the benefits
from skill transfers and resource sharing (Liedtka. 1996). These high costs may
discourage corporate managers from coordinating operating activities o f divisions related
to core business for operating synergies. As a result, corporate managers may choose to
exercise the decentralized operating control across divisions regardless o f core-business
relatedness.

Core-business Relatedness, Division Risk-taking Strategy', and Performance
The relationships among core-business relatedness, division risk-taking strategy,
and performance were viewed from a strategic fit perspective. This study focused on the
dual roles of core-business relatedness as an antecedent o f division risk-taking strategy
and as a moderator o f the relationship o f division risk-taking strategy and performance. It
was proposed that the core-business knowledge achieved by collective learning among
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divisions leads to a high commitment to risk-taking strategy and that operating and
marketing synergies based on inter-divisional coordination and accumulated knowledge
about a competition paradigm positively affect the implementation process o f division
risk-taking strategy. The expected relationship was supported by R&D investment but not
supported by internationalization. The moderator role was not supported by both
indicators o f division risk-taking strategy.
Core-business Relatedness and Division Risk-taking Strategy.

It is interesting to

note that two indicators o f division risk-taking strategy. R&D investment and
internationalization, showed different results for the effect o f core-business relatedness.
The results show that divisions related to the core business have higher R&D investm ent
than divisions not related, while there was no significant difference in internationalization
between two groups. One possible explanation can be suggested for this differentiated
effect o f core-business relatedness. The different results found in two risk-taking
strategies may reflect the differences in each o f the risk-taking indicators. R&D
investment strategy focuses primarily on dealing with product and process technology
opportunities for innovation. Export activities are concerned more with dealing with
market opportunities. Seizing these opportunities depends on different types o f
knowledge: that is. product versus market knowledge. It is possible that divisions related
to the core business can take advantage o f the technological competencies in making
R&D investment. Transferring and sharing these competencies occur only among
divisions around the core business o f the firm. However, international m arket-related
resources and knowledge for export activities is likely to have a higher transferability
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across divisions o f the firm than the technology-based competence developed for core
business activities. It is because knowledge focused on the core business is industry- or
product-specific but much foreign market knowledge is country- or region-specific.
Foreign market knowledge, including the trade policy o f a host country, can be shared
and utilized am ong divisions even though they do not have much sim ilarity in terms of
product and process technology.
Core-business Relatedness as Moderator.

Another important finding can be

noted from results o f testing the moderating effect o f core-business relatedness on the
relationship o f division risk-taking strategy and performance. This study, focusing on the
complex interactions between corporate-level and division-level strategic behaviors,
hypothesized the moderating effect o f core-business relatedness: that is. core-business
related divisions would have better internal environments for successful implementation
o f risk-taking strategies than would unrelated divisions. It was found that core-business
relatedness affects division risk-taking strategy but does not moderate the relationship of
division risk-taking strategy and performance. The findings on the m oderating effects o f
relatedness is not consistent with the finding o f B ettis's (1981) study that related firms
achieve higher returns for research and developm ent compared with unrelated firms. But
the current study's results provide support for Stimpert and Duhaim e's (1997) finding
that diversification strategy affects business-level strategy. R&D investm ent and capital
investment. Com bined with the previous findings o f diversification studies, the findings
o f the present study suggest that relatedness influences division perform ance and that
core-business related divisions are likely to be more profitable because they make a high
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commitment to R&D investment for business success in their individual markets.

Corporate Control, Division Risk-taking Strategy, and Performance
The relationship among corporate control, division risk-taking strategy, and
performance was viewed from agency theory and strategic fit perspective. This study
focused the dual roles o f corporate control as an antecedent o f division risk-taking
strategy and as a moderator o f the relationship between risk-taking strategies and
performance. It was proposed that divisions under centralized control w ould have higher
commitment to risk-taking strategies than would divisions under full and laissez-faire
control. It was proposed that operating control was positively related to division risktaking strategies whereas financial control was negatively related to risk-taking strategies.
It was also hypothesized that divisions under centralized control had better internal
environments for the successful implementation o f risk-taking strategies than would
divisions under full and laissez-faire control. It was proposed that operating control
would make a positive contribution to a division's performance with a risk-taking
strategy whereas financial control would make a negative contribution to a division's
performance with a risk-taking strategy.
This study found that divisions under laissez-faire control showed higher
commitment to R&D investment than did divisions under centralized control. But no
significant difference between groups was found by internationalization. Financial and
operating controls were effective in distinguishing divisions in terms o f both indicators o f
risk-taking strategy. The moderator role was not supported by both corporate control
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types and each dim ensions o f corporate control, operating and financial control.
Corporate Control and Division Risk-taking Strategy.

The relationship o f

corporate control and division risk-taking strategy proposed from the agency perspective
was partially supported. The positive effect o f centralized operating control on division
risk-taking strategy was found as expected when using internationalization as an indicator
o f risk-taking strategy. But in the case o f R&D investment, the relationship between
operating control and risk-taking strategy was found to be negative, contrary to the
hypothesized direction. These inconsistent findings ask for an explanation and raise
questions about the adopted framework to explain the relationship o f the corporate office
and divisions.
It was hypothesized that the commitment to R&D would be lower under laissezfaire control because o f the agency problem at the divisional level. But the study found
the opposite to be true. This inconsistency can lead to speculation that the agency
problem that usually occurs between a corporate office and divisions in the Western
countries may not occur in Korean business groups. As mentioned in Chapter 2. agency
problems result from information asymmetry and goal conflicts between principals and
agents (Eisenhardt. 1989). The degree o f information asymmetry and the degree o f goal
conflict between corporate managers and divisional managers o f Korean business groups
may be unexpectedly low. Two managerial characteristics o f the Korean business group
can be suggested as possible reasons for a low degree o f information asymmetry as well
as for low goal conflict: family participation in group and divisional management and the
Yongo relationship at all levels o f management (the Yongo relationship means that high-
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level managers are hired on the basis o f blood, school, and regional relationship).
Participation of founders and their families in business group m anagem ent and
divisional managem ent might be a reason for low information asymmetry and low goal
conflict. Researchers note management by family as one o f the m ajor managerial
characteristics o f Korean business groups (e.g.. Lee & Yoo. 1987). Most Korean
business groups are managed by the founder-owner or his/her family. One study reports
that 31 percent o f the executive officers o f the top twenty Korean business groups consist
of family m embers (Lee & Yoo. 1987). It is reported that, as o f 1987. 48.8 percent o f
presidents o f m em ber companies o f Korean business groups are founders and their family
members (Shin. 1992). Even though those statistics are old. it seems that not much
change has occurred in recent years. These family managers play the role o f liaison
between the corporate office and divisions and sometimes monitor non-family managers'
opportunistic behavior. Family managers at core positions o f divisions can collect
various and crucial information about division strategy formulation and implementation.
Another reason may be found in the relationships o f top managers at the group
level and the divisional level of a business group. Key managerial positions are often
filled on the basis o f common geographical and school ties. These connections give those
with the same background common identities (i.e.. homogeneity) and a sense o f
belonging. And in turn, this works as an important factor affecting em ployees' behaviors
(Kim. 1989; Lee. 1989). These homogeneous groups exert more influence and pressure
for conformity than do groups that are not homogeneous (Festinger. 1954. Heider. 1958;
Newcomb. 1956). The homogeneity from the Yongo relationship plays the role o f social
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control for ensuring the loyalty o f subordinates and predictability o f their behavior.
Loyalty and predictability influence positively the level o f trust am ong people involved
(Butler, 1991). Thus, they are likely to attenuate opportunistic behavior and facilitate
conflict resolution.
In Korean business groups, agency problems are easily found in the relationship
between owner-managers and other stakeholders including m inority investors and
workers. Although more than 50 percent o f outstanding shares o f Korean firms are
owned by outside minority investors, the founder families have absolute control o f their
firms and there is no effective corporate governance mechanism that protects the interests
of multiple stakeholders against those o f the founder families' (Chung. Lee. & Jung.
1997). As a result, owner-managers can easily pursue their own interests at the expense
o f the majority o f outside m inority investors.
By way o f explaining the reason for the research results inconsistent with the
hypothesis based on the agency theory', this study looks to the literature on organization
design. This literature provides a plausible relationship between operating control and
R&D investment (e.g.. Bum s & Stalker. 1961: Thompson. 1965). It argues that a
relatively decentralized structure is likely to provide a context in which more new ideas
are generated than in a centralized structure. Kanter (1983) suggests that, in a
decentralized structure, managers have more autonomy and more control over resources
and these attributes enable them to initiate and test new ideas that can eventually result in
innovations. Hage and Aiken (1967) found a negative relation between innovation and
close hierarchic supervision. Further, it is suggested that centralized organizations
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increase the likelihood that promising new ideas will be censored or resources will be
denied, reducing the number o f innovations adopted. In the centralized structure, new
ideas must travel an extended chain o f command before receiving approval or resource
support (Pierce & Delbecq. 1977).
Consistent with these suggestions and findings, the results o f the present study
indicate a negative relationship between the centralization o f operating control and R&D
investment (r = - 0.429. p < 0.01). For the purpose o f better understanding, a further
analysis was performed. The data were split by core-business relatedness. The results
suggest that the harm o f centralization would be relatively salient in the divisions not
related to the core business (r= -0.287 at the p = 0.10 level for core-business related
divisions; r = -0.577 at the p = 0.01 level for non-core business divisions). Under
centralized corporate control, even though the corporate offices lack intimate
understanding o f a division's individual businesses, they centralize operating decisions
and strategic decision making and thereby fail to develop division R&D opportunities.
However, the suggestion in the organization design literature that a decentralized
structure leads to a high commitment to risk-taking strategies is not consistent with the
finding that the centralization of operating control is positively related to
internationalization. The relationship between operating control and internationalization
is contradictory to the relationship between operating control and R&D investment. Why
did this contradictory finding happen? One possible explanation is that, in Korea, export
activities are highly promoted by the government and are supported by corporate offices
o f business groups. The rapid growth o f the Korean economy from an underdeveloped
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economy to a m ajor economic power has been, to a large extent, the result o f the
governm ent's export-driven economic policies (Chung et al.. 1997: Sakong. 1993). To
accelerate export-led growth, the Korean governm ent provided Korean firms with
intensive export promotion, including financial support for exporters, tax incentives on
export sales, tariff incentives on imported raw materials, and so on. These export
promotion activities encourage Korean firms to undertake active export activities.
The corporate offices of Korean business groups also have encouraged their
affiliated com panies to do active exporting in order to overcome the limit o f business
growth that solely depended on a small domestic market (Shin. 1992). To this end. the
corporate office provided its divisions with both tangible and intangible resources needed
to internationalize their efforts ranging from exporting to foreign direct investment.
Because the support from the corporate office depends on the relationship between the
corporate office and a division, divisions under centralized control are more likely to have
access to corporate resources than are divisions under decentralized control. It makes the
corporate office’s support more expedient and m akes support from other divisions easier
through the corporate office's intervention. In sum . the unique system and activities o f
the Korean government and corporate offices o f Korean business groups for exporting
may lead to a positive relationship between centralized operating control and
internationalization.
Corporate Control as Moderator. No statistical significance was found on the
moderating effects o f operating control and financial control on the relationship between
division risk-taking strategy and its financial performance. The results, however, showed
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that the interaction terms o f operating control and division risk-taking strategy had
positive signs. In the tested regression model, the interaction term o f operating control
and R&D investment has b weight o f 1.448 at the/? = 0.119 level and the interaction o f
operating control and internationalization has b weight o f 0.425 at the p - 0.497 level (cfi.
Table 4-16). The interaction effect o f operating control and R&D investment on
performance was almost statistically significant at the/? = 0.10 level.
Although the interaction between centralized control and division risk-taking
strategy was not statistically significant, these results suggest that centralization o f
operational decision making influences positively the relationship between division risktaking strategy and performance. In other words, decentralized operating control seems
to provide no significant contribution to divisions in implementing R&D projects
effectively. Because o f no prior empirical evidence regarding the effect o f operating
control on the relationship between risk-taking strategy and perform ance, the present
study's speculation on these findings is limited. Future empirical research is needed for a
better understanding o f the relationships between corporate control, division risk-taking
strategy, and performance.

Theoretical Implications
The approaches and findings o f the present study provide some implications for
theory building in strategic management. First, the prior studies on strategic management
issues have primarily dealt with research questions from one level o f the organization:
either at the corporate level or at the business unit level (Dess et al. 1995). The present

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

128

study highlights the interaction between corporate and divisional levels. This study found
that the core-business relatedness resulting from corporate-level strategy influences a
division's risk-taking strategy and its performance. And it also found that the control
system from the corporate office influences division risk-taking strategy. These findings
demonstrated the importance o f interlevel studies focusing on the interconnections
between the corporate and business levels.
Second, the research approach and the findings o f this study have implications for
research on the diversification-performance relationship. As noted previously, prior
research on the relationship has not produced conclusive results despite a large amount o f
study (Dess et al.. 1995; Ramanujam & Varadarajan. 1989). Researchers indicated two
major potential reasons: industry effects and the unit o f analysis problem. Diversification
strategy research mainly deals with one o f the two research questions: "Does
diversification create value?” and "Does one diversification strategy promise better
performance than another diversification strategy?" (Ram anujam & Varadarajan. 1989)
The research approach used in this study is related with the second question and shows
how the question can be approached by adopting the divisional level as the unit o f
analysis. The approach show ed how to control industry effects on performance by using
industry-adjusted performance. This study demonstrated that the research design at the
divisional level can be em ployed to understand the value o f corporate diversification
strategy.
Third, this study has implications for the concept o f relatedness. It introduced the
concept o f core-business relatedness in studying the relationship between corporate
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diversification and division performance. Recently. Davis and his colleagues (1992)
investigated the relationship between relatedness and performance at the business unit
level. They focused on the perceived relatedness rather than on objective relatedness by
using unit-level m anagers's responses to survey questions related to product and market
similarity between their business units. Their study did not consider whether the
similarity is formed centering around the core business o f the corporation. This study
focused on the division's relatedness to core business(es) o f the corporation and also put
emphasis on the interaction between the corporate office and divisions around the core
business.
Fourth, the findings o f the present study have implications for agency theory. On
the basis o f inconsistent findings, this study suggested that the agency problems that
usually occur between a corporate office and divisions in the Western countries may not
occur in Korean business groups. Two managerial characteristics o f the Korean business
group were suggested as possible reasons o f such a low degree o f agency problem: family
participation in group and divisional management and the Yongo relationship at all levels
of management. That is. U.S. firms, even with the danger o f creating agency problems,
hire professional managers to achieve corporate objectives effectively and then initiate
formal control system s to minimize agency problems, whereas Korean firms hire family
managers or friends to control potential agency problems even at the risk o f
organizational effectiveness. This suggests that potential contextual factors m ust be
considered in testing agency arguments on the relationship between corporate offices and
divisions.
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Managerial Implications
The results o f the present study have some implications for managers. First, this
study suggests an answer to the question o f how the corporate office diversifies to create
value for its divisions. Core-business relatedness is the answer. This study found that
divisions related to the core business o f the corporation outperform divisions not related
to the core business. Core-business related divisions were found to be m ore committed to
R&D investment than were unrelated divisions. Multibusiness com panies consist of
businesses which could exist independently. However, divisions can have the advantage
of being under the umbrella o f a corporation in the form o f creating and sharing core
competencies among related divisions and with the corporate office. Divisions which can
not share core competence with other divisions fail to realize the benefit from a corporate
office and/or sister divisions, even though they are under the umbrella o f one corporation.
Organizational collective learning and capabilities consisting o f com petence lead to a
division's attitude toward risk taking and in turn, competitive advantage in its individual
market. In the process o f organizational learning, the corporate office plays the role of
guardian and promoter o f the competence centering around its core business! es).
Second, the results of this study indicate that corporate control across divisions
forms the context in which divisions make strategic decisions. This study found that
corporate control affects a division's attitude toward risk taking strategy. It is a corporate
office that sets the relationship between the corporate office and its divisions. This
relationship represents internal decision m aking and control and forms the context o f the
division's strategic decision making. The corporate office can create value for its
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divisions if it provides its divisions with corporate control encouraging the divisions to
have a higher com m itm ent to risk-taking strategies which are directly related to a
division's competitive advantage. The corporate office will destroy value and waste
resources if it provides its divisions with corporate control which discourages risk-taking.
Third, managers need to realize that corporate control system s which fail to
consider context factors influencing the relationship o f a corporate office and divisions
lead to unexpected outcom e from the divisions. Agency theory suggests that centralized
control from the corporate office is needed to prevent agency problem s and risk-sharing
problem stemming from a division's self-interest and opportunism. However, this study
found that centralized control rather discouraged division R&D investm ent. It was
speculated that the relationship between a corporate office and its divisions in Korean
business groups may be influenced by unique managerial practices based on participation
o f family managers and connections between top managers. In countries wath a low
possibility o f agency problem s between a corporate office and its divisions, centralized
control designed to prevent agency problem results in over controlling and fails to
motivate agents to achieve goals expected by a principal. Especially when the corporate
office adopts a centralized control system for its divisions unrelated to its core business
the outcome can be disastrous. Thus, in designing corporate control across divisions,
context factors which can influence the relationship between a corporate office and
divisions must be considered.
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Limitations of the Study
The findings presented must be viewed in the context o f the major limitations o f
the present study. First, this study used a small size o f sample for testing the hypotheses.
A study with larger samples would increase the generalizability o f the conceptual
framework.
Second, this study employed a single respondent per company. Executives who
are very knowledgeable about the managerial practices o f their business groups (C hief
Planning Officer at the division) were used as key informants o f self reporting. Although
the results o f the reliability test showed sufficient support for the measurement, a study
employing a multiple rater approach would increase the reliability and validity o f the
measurement.
Third, this study relied on cross-sectional data. Associated relationships
suggested in the research hypotheses involve causal relations between constructs.
However, such data prevent the research from accurately testing the causal relationship
between the independent variable and the dependent variable. This is because there
should be a time lag between strategic activities and performance outcome. By
examining causal linkages in the longitudinal research design, it will be possible to better
examine causal relationships suggested in this study.
Fourth, the present study was also limited in its use o f division performance
measure. The logic behind using a Financial indicator, industry adjusted ROA. as division
performance implies that effective implementation o f division risk-taking strategy would
be reflected on this financial performance indicator. As Venkatraman and Ramanujam
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(1986) indicated, operational performance is another domain o f overall organizational
performance. A sim ilar study employing both indicators o f financial performance and
operational perform ance (e.g.. ROA and innovation success, or ROA and market share)
would provide more understanding o f the relationships between corporate diversification,
corporate control, division risk-taking strategy, and performance.

Suggestion for Future Research
The findings o f this study can suggest some important directions for future
research. First, future research can use project-level data to examine the effect o f
corporate strategy and control on division risk-taking strategies. Innovation projects and
international m arket development projects will be good examples o f division risk-taking
strategies. These projects can also be studied by adopting the case study approach.
Using the case study method, theoretical arguments can be tested with the abundant data
collected by several methods: archives, interviews, questionnaire, and observations
(Eisenhardt. 1989).
Second, future studies need to develop an integrated model of corporate strategic
decisions and their impact on division strategy and performance. The interdependent
relationships found in this study suggest a direction o f future studies in developing an
integrated model. This study found that core-business relatedness influences division
risk-taking strategy as well as division performance. This finding implies that corporate
strategy influences division performance directly and indirectly through division risktaking strategies. The relationship o f core-business relatedness and division performance
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was significant after considering the effects o f corporate control and division risk-taking
strategy on division performance (cf.. Table 4-15 and 4-16). These direct and indirect
effects can be strictly tested in an integrated model. Furthermore, this study found that
corporate control influences division risk-taking strategies. The effect was still
significant after controlling for the influence o f core-business relatedness ( c f . Table 4-6).
It implies that corporate control should be considered in developing a causal model
between corporate strategy, division risk-taking strategy, and division perform ance.
Third, future studies need to further explore how the relationship between a
principal and an agent is influenced by context factors such as national culture, corporate
culture, and informal information systems. Since agency theory focuses mainly on the
relationship between humans, it is important to investigate potential context factors which
can influence human relations. Future work should consider context factors when testing
the effects o f control system s suggested by agency theory. Especially, future studies
attempting to apply agency theoretical arguments internationally should consider the
potential context factors influencing human relations. Along with these studies, the
future efforts are needed to identify the context factors which can influence the agency
relationship.

Conclusion
The present research explored the effects o f two major functions o f corporate
strategic management, corporate diversification and corporate control, on the divisional
management. This them e was organized into four specific research issues: (1) the effect
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o f core-business relatedness on division performance: (2) the relationship between corebusiness relatedness and corporate control: (3) the effect of core-business relatedness on
the relationship between division risk-taking strategy and performance: and (4) the effect
o f corporate control on the relationship between division risk-taking strategy and
performance. Theoretical linkages for these issues were suggested from the following
perspectives: the resource-based view, organizational learning, agency, contingency, and
strategic management perspectives.
This research found that core-business relatedness influences division risk-taking
strategy as well as division performance. It was also found that corporate control affects
division risk-taking strategy. These results suggest that interactions betw een corporatelevel strategic management and division-level strategic management influence division
performance and ultimately, corporate performance. They show that strategic decisions
at multiple levels o f the corporation are interconnected. The effective m anagem ent o f the
connected decisions would be an im portant source o f competitive advantage. On the
basis o f the interconnections, a corporate office can create or destroy opportunities for its
divisions to achieve competitive advantage. The importance o f connections found in this
study implies that prior studies' findings on diversified companies at only one level o f
analysis need to be combined for better understanding o f corporate and divisional
strategic management. The potential connections can be inferred from the previous
findings on strategic management factors such as strategic options, control systems,
information systems, and others. Future efforts to build an integrated model o f strategic
management factors across organizational levels would advance our understanding o f
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organizational strategy and provide valuable implications for practitioners.
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Name o f Business Group

N um ber o f Subjects o f Questionnaire
Survey

1

Samsung

12

2

Hyundai

14

j

Daewoo

8

4

LG

5

Hanjin

6

SK

5

7

Kia

1

8

Ssangyong

6

9

Hanhwa

9

10

Halla

5

11

Kumho

4

12

Daelim

J

13

Doosan

10

14

Kohap

5

15

Hvosung

8

16

Hanil

2

17

Anam

4

18

Dongkuk Steel

7

19

Shinho

4

20

Hansol

4

21

Lotte

6

22

Tongil

j

23

Kolon

4

24

Tongkook Trading

j

25

Dongbu

2

12

■*>
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Name o f Business Group

Number o f subjects o f questionnaire
survey

26

Samvang

-*
j

27

Saehan

1

28

Bucksan

3

29

Kabul

1

30

Keopyung

5

31

Hankook Tire

1

32

Youngpoong
Kangwon Industries

2

34

Miwon(Daesang)

4

35

Oriental Chemical

-»
J

36

Tong Yang

J

37

Pacific

4

38

Poongsan

1

39

Sung Shin Portland

1

40

Kum Kang

41

Sepoong

1

42

Taekwang Industries

1

43

Dae duck Industries

1

44

Jindo

1

45

Taihan Electric Wire

1

46

Shinwon

1

47

Kukdong Construction

1

48

Samhwan Enterprise

1

49

Samhwa Capacitor

2
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Name o f Business Group

50

Number o f subjects o f questionnaire
survey

Kyungbang
Total

192

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONNAIRE
(English Vesion)

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

I Questions about Organizational Structure
1. Please indicate w h ich o f the fo llo w in g m ost c lo s e ly resem ble the basic organizational
structure o f your b u sin ess group:

(a)

T ype I

□

D iv isio n a l Structure

Group Planning Office

Member Company

M em ber Company

M arketing

(b)

T ype II

Finance

Member Company

Production

□

D iv isio n a l Structure

G ro up P l an n i ng Off ice

Business Sector
Group

Business Sector
Group

Member
Company

Marketing

(c)

Business Sector
Group

Member
Company

Finance

Production

Other -- P lease G iv e D etails
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□

2. H ow long has the organizational structure you indicated been in ex isten ce ?

D

Less than a year
L ess than five years

CD For m ore than fiv e years
3. D o e s your group have gro u p -lev el planning o ffic e or its correspondent organization unit?
Y es Q

No Q

4 . H ow m any m em ber com p an ies d o e s your group have? __________

II Questions about the C ontrol Type o f Y our G roup
5. W hich o f the fo llo w in g factors are used by the Group Planning O ffic e or its correspondent
organization unit to evaluate the perform ance o f your com pany ?
P lease circle the appropriate resp on se using the follow in g scale:
1=
2 =
3 =
4 =
5 =

Very important
Important
O f average im portance
Rarely used
N ot a factor
2

J

4

5

1

T

n
J

4

5

1

2

J

4

5

1

J

4

5

| S a les Growth

1

3

4

5

! M arket Share

1

2

j

4

5

1

*■>

j

4

1

2

•>
j

4

^

| C apacity U tilization

1

2

3

4

5

| Labor Productivity

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

J

4

j G ross Profit

1

1 Profit Growth
I Return on Sales
•
i Return on Investm ent

:

j C ash F low
l
i
| C apital Investm ent L evels

:
:

j C o st lev els
i

i

| O ther — Please sp ecify
!
i...... — ..........
.....

1

- .....

-jl

.........
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!

1

5

5
5

1

5

160
6 . T o w hat exten t do th e top m anagem ent team o f your com pany have the authority to act on the
p roblem s d escribed b e lo w , w ithout group approval? (A ssu m e b u sin ess con d ition s are fairly
g o o d , and all d iv isio n s are p rofitable.)
P lease circle the appropriate response using the follow ing scale:
1=
2 =
3 =
4 =

The top m anagem ent team can take action w ithout any con tact w ith group o ffice
The top m anagem ent team takes action — inform s group o ffic e later
A d v ise group o ffic e in advance o f action the team intends to take
T he top m an agem en t team has to obtain formal approval from group o ffice
before taking an y action

S e le c t the replacem ent for the production m anager
: w h o w ill retire soon

1

2

3

4

A uthorize 20% increase in the com p an y material
inventory, in anticipation o f a p o ssib le strike

1

2

3

4

Prom ote a m anager to the p osition o f ex ecu tiv e at
periodical personnel ch a n g es___________________________________________________________________
S w itch a m em ber o f th e top m anagem ent team (e.g.. a
e x e c u tiv e director) from o n e position to another
p osition at the equal level

1

2

Pass final approval on the d esig n o f a new product.
and authorize work to start on production toolin g

1

2

3

4

S ettle a m inor dispute w ith union representative

1

2

3

4
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6. (con tin u ed )T o w hat ex ten t d o the top m anagem ent team o f your com pany have the authority
to act on the problem s d escrib ed b elow , w ithout group approval?
Please circle the appropriate response using the fo llo w ing scale:
1=
2 =
3 =
4 =

The top m an a g em en t team can take action w ithout any contact with group o ffice
The top m an agem en t team takes action -- inform s group o ffic e later
A d v ise group o f f ic e in ad vance o f action the team intends to take
The top m an agem en t team has to obtain form al approval from group o ffice
before taking an y action

j

4

->

3

4

1

2

3

4

R e-establish the list p rice o f a m ajor product line

1

2

j

4

Increase the price o f an e x istin g product line by 5%.
to attem pt to recover c o st increases in material and
labor. T his w ill p la ce the price ab ove the com p etitive
lev el.

1

->

j

4

M ake a ch an ge in the m em b er com pany inventory
standards, w hich w ill reduce field shipping stocks but
increase factory w o rk -in -p ro cess inventory,
m aintaining the sam e total investm ent

1

j

4

Increase investm ent in inventory on a main product.
because the sa les departm ent feels that they can get
m ore sales i f they ha v e greater product availability

1

j

«*

4

Introduce a n ew production system into the factory.
that m av lead to a strike

1

j

4

C hange the a d vertisin g program o f the m em ber
com pany, redu cin g m a g a zin e advertising but
increasing T V and radio advertising

1

j

4

A uthorize to increase the num ber o f salesm en in the
field , but reduce the nu m ber o f m anufacturing
engin eers to m aintain the sam e total cost

1

3

4

Establish n ext m o n th 's m anufacturing schedule for
the d iv isio n , at an in creased level w hich w ill require
; the hiring o f 3% m ore p eo p le in the factory

1

Establish next m o n th ’s m anufacturing schedule at a
substantially higher le v e l w h ich w ill require an
addition o f about 25% m ore p eop le in the factory

1

Postpone the sch ed u led introduction o f a n ew m odel
and authorize a m o d ifica tio n o f the design
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6. (co n tin u ed )T o w hat extent do the top m anagem ent team o f your com pany have the authority
to act on the p rob lem s described below , w ithout group approval?
Please circle the appropriate response using the fo llo w in g scale:
1=
2 =
3 =
4 =

The top m anagem ent team can take action w ith ou t any contact with group o ffic e
The top m anagem ent team takes action — in form s group o ffic e later
A d v ise group o ffic e in advance o f action the team intends to take
The top m anagem ent team has to obtain form al approval from group o ffic e
before taking any action

A uthorize the factory to m o d ify next m onth's
m anufacturing sch ed u le to reduce the b acklog o f
overdue orders
C ancel tw o en g in eerin g d evelopm ent projects

1

2

3

4

C hange the m em b er co m p a n y 's main supplier

1

2

3

4

A uthorize an 1 b illion w o n 's R&D expense

1

2

3

4

Set the transfer price at w hich your com p an y's
products are so ld to other m em ber com panies w ithin
the group

1

2

3

4

S elect a replacem ent for old m anufacturing facilities

1

2

3

4

C hange a ser v ic e system in custom er services area to
im prove co st structure

1

3

4

2
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7.

To what d eg ree are the fo llo w in g the responsibility o f Group O ffices?
Please ind icate the degree o f responsibility as follow s:
1=
2 =
3 =
4 =
5=

A lw a y s th e resp on sib ility o f group o ffic e s
N early a lw a y s the responsibility o f group o ffice s
A shared resp on sib ility with the m em ber com pany
Rarely the resp on sib ility o f group o ffic e s
N ev er th e resp o n sib ility o f group o ffic e s

Please circle the appropriate response

Peoriodical en viron m en t analysis (for analyzing
threats and opp ortu n ities)

1

*>

A nalyzing b u sin ess com p etitive position

1

^

Approval o f m ajor b u sin ess investm ent

1

^

Long-term strategic planning

I

Public rela tio n s(in clu d in g relations with the
governm ent)

I

R elations w ith financial institutions

|

Legal functions

1

Identifying a cq u isitio n s

4

5

4

5

J

4

5

3

4

5

j

4

5

3

4

5

^

j

4

5

I

“>

j

*

4

5

D ecidin g upon acq u isition s

1

^

j

■'»

4

N

Setting major expend itu res

1

^

j

■■I

4

5

Setting strategic direction for the m em ber com pany

I

■*»

4

5

A nalyzing product life cy c le

1

^

4

5

R esetting industry portfolio

1

-)

4

5

8.
5.

^

J

j

3

How long has the gro u p 's control type w hich you indicated in the a b o v e questions (Q uestion
6. and 7) been in e x isten ce?

D

L ess than a year

n

L ess than fiv e years

□

For m ore than fiv e years
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III Questions about Strategic B ehavior o f Y our Company
9.

O rganizational Strategic B eh a vior Inform ation

1993

1995

1994

R & D expenditure /
Total sales
(%)
Export sales / Total
sa les
(%)

IV Questions about Y our B ackground Inform ation

Y ou r group nam e

______________________________________

Y our com pany nam e
Y ou r title

__________________________________________________

_______________________________________

N u m b er o f Years you have been w ith the com p an y
N u m ber o f Years you have been in the group

____________________

____________________

W ould you like a copy o f the Sum m ary o f this study?

Q Y es

Q No

Thank you for your tim e and coo p eration .
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